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From Confrontation to Partnership
by J. Antonio Villamil

George Bush launched a
far-reaching plan to increase economic cooperation in the hemisphere
by creating, in the long
term, a regional free-trade zone.
This announcement provides a
blueprint for regional action,
based on the principle of free
trade rather than increased
economic aid. The blueprint highlights the concept of a "partnership" to bolster hemispheric
prosperity, an approach made
possible by Latin America's pronounced movement towards
democracy and free markets.
Inter-American discourse could
shift, therefore, from disjointed approaches to economic problems,
such as the debt "crisis," to a comprehensive program to stimulate
regional economic growth. The success of this opportunity hinges on
the establishment of preconditions
for increased economic intercourse.

would foster steady increases in the
hemisphere's economic welfare.
The US cannot re-emerge as a
net capital exporter, however, unless it sharply reduces its fiscal deficit and stimulates private saving
through pro-growth fiscal reform.
The current US tax code, for example, promotes consumption at

The Plan
To begin with, the US must shift
from being a net capital importer
to its proper role as a net capital exporter, like Japan and Germany.
Such a shift promises to allow
scarce capital to flow into lessdeveloped countries that offer increasing investment returns as they
consolidate free-market policies. As
a result, a capital-exporting US

J. Antonio Villamil is chief economist

for the US Department of Commerce.
Responsibilityfor the views expressed
lies solely with the authorand not with
the US Department of Commerce.
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the expense of saving and production. Nonetheless, a promising sign
is the current progress in bipartisan budget negotiations to reduce
the fiscal imbalance. The outcome
of such negotiations is uncertain,
given fundamental differences in
tax philosophy between Democrats
and Republicans, a weakened US
economy, and the outbreak of the
Gulf crisis. A pro-growth budgetary

package would include the following measures: reductions in federal
expenditures as a percent of gross
national product; reform of socalled entitlement expenditures
like medicare; budgetary reform
such as line-item veto power by the
president; and business-transaction
taxes to increase revenues. In addition, implementation of a lower
capital gains tax on longer-term investments would stimulate saving
and production.
Another precondition is world
trade liberalization under the socalled Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT). The multilateral
trade discussions began in 1986
and are scheduled to end in
December 1990. A favorable agreement would unleash nearly $1 trillion in world trade that is currently
subject to regulatory barriers, creating explicit rules and processes for
the settlement of trade disputes.
Furthermore, signatories of the
agreement would commit to a
steady reduction in agricultural
practices that distort international
trade. Among such practices are
domestic subsidies, price supports,
and export subsidies.
The US, Canada, and many
agricultural exporting countries of
the hemisphere are strongly committed to agricultural trade liberalization. There is significant
opposition, however, from members of the European Economic
Community, especially France and
Germany, which heavily subsidize
their agricultural sectors. By the
same token, Congress would continue to vote in favor of US agricultural subsidies-as the recent farm
support bill shows-unless an
agreement is reached to liberalize
agricultural trade under GATT.

Y

The stakes in the current
deliberations are high. We can
expect that a trade liberalization
agreement will be signed in December, given its importance to world
prosperity. A GATT agreement
would provide a framework for
negotiating regional free-trade
agreements, and would be the best
insurance for the Americas against
a world of rival trade blocs.
As yet another precondition,
Latin American nations must continue the process of free-market reform, including the consolidation
of open trade and investment
policies, to enhance economic efficiency. A free-trade agreement
without such reform would exacerbate Latin America's structural inefficiencies and restrict the region's
economic growth. The key is to allow the free flow of resources to
those productive activities that offer the highest returns. This can be
done only if business activities are
deregulated and if investment is allocated on the basis of free prices,
including market-determined exchange rates and interest rates.
Measures to reduce official,
government-to-government debt
are a vital part of the Bush initiative. For instance, creditor governments could accept deep discounts
in the face value of official debts,
longer-term rescheduling of payments, and reductions in interest
rates. A major share of Latin America's scarce national resources is
now devoted to servicing external
debts, a policy that transfers resources from less-developed to developed countries. The plan to
relieve official debt would complement the Brady initiative on private
external debt and would significantly benefit the region's smaller
economies, above all in Central

America and the Caribbean, with
high ratios of official debt to total
external debt.

Momentum
In short, the Bush initiative provides a road map for improving the

long-term economic welfare of the
hemisphere. The consultative
process among nations is in full
swing and promises eventually to
achieve a regional free-trade zone.
Mexico, which is on track to become a hemispheric economic
power in the 21st century, has already signaled its intention to
move towards a free-trade agreement with the US. The Southern
Cone countries seem inclined to
create their own trade bloc, and
then negotiate as a region for a
free-trade agreement with the US
and other countries of the Americas. There is growing momentum,
then, in favor of the Bush plan. At
a minimum the plan has changed
the tone of inter-American dialogue from confrontation over
economic issues to constructive
discussion of development initiatives.
The results ultimately depend
on our hemisphere's commitment
to the creation of the appropriate
environment for economic cooperation rather than conflict.
Count me as a cautious optimist
that the Bush initiative will succeed
and that the 21st century will usher
in an era of improved living standards for the peoples of the
Americas. .
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Commentary

The Crisis in Trinidad
by Anthony P. Maingot

July and August 1990, a
band of violent men, led
by an ex-policeman with
the adopted name of
Iman Yasin Abu Bakr, attempted to overthrow the government of Trinidad by holding much
of the government and all of the
people hostage.
Were this event of interest only
to Trinidadians, it would not be
worth reviving. Its importance, however, reaches beyond the confines
of that island. It relates directly to
the situation of many Caribbean
countries, which, like so many
other countries around the world,
are in transition from statedirected welfare states to freemarket economic systems. The
social, political, and economic tensions unleashed by the "adjustments" are everywhere enormous.
Small Caribbean democracies,
though, are facing a particularly
dangerous situation: they are open
systems lacking even elementary
forms of state security. Television
footage of four prime ministerial
bodyguards trying to fend off 40
armed rebels with nothing more
than handguns is a convincing
reminder of that democratic
civilian reality.

Abu Bakr inPerspective
An understanding of Trinidad's social and political processes requires
more than the typical reporting on
'"Third World turmoil." Even more
important, it requires more attention and sympathetic concern from
those in positions of influence in
the US. Not only has such concern
not been forthcoming, but what
has been said tends to be way off
the mark. This superficial analysis

4
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is demonstrated by no less a figure
than Mervyn M. Dymally, Trinidadborn member of the US Congress
from California and a congressional leader on Caribbean affairs.
In an August 3 letter to his colleagues asking them to oppose any
US intervention, Dymally spoke of
the island's "grave social and economic injustices" and of an economy that had "virtually collapsed."

It is not at all surprising, therefore,
that he should characterize the
hostage-taking as stemming from
"essentially a situation of social and
economic neglect and exclusion of
the Trinidad people."
Above and beyond the superficiality of the analysis, Dymally, and
the many who argued like him, are
guilty of one of the most prevalent
and, as such pernicious, tendencies
in the interpretation of Third
World politics: the automatic linking of rebellion against established

authorities with conditions of injustice and denial. History tells us that
two dangerous self-delusions logically extend from this tendency:
the assumption that the rebels invariably pursue justice and equality, or that they at least have to be
better than the existing evil. The
experiences of both Grenada and
Suriname should have taught us to
avoid such traps. But there is
another insidious tendency: events,
which in the US or Europe would
be regarded as little more than
criminal acts, take on political and
even moral tones when they occur
in the Third World.
One cannot help but wonder,
for instance, what Mr. Dymally's
position is regarding Milwaukee
alderman Mike McGee who has
formed a Black Panther militia.
McGee warns that unless some
$100 million is invested in
Milwaukee's black area by 1995,
the militia will take matters into its
own hands "with a reign of terror
against the white way of life" (The
Economist, August 18, 1990, p. 19).
Polls do not indicate much support
for McGee's position, but the
Economist quotes a black professor
at the University of Wisconsin who
believes McGee reflects the feelings
of an overwhelming majority of
frustrated black Americans.
It can safely be assumed that
Abu Bakr also reflected the frustrations of many Trinidadians. He certainly timed his act accordingly. In
what way, however, does this justify
the nearly automatic linking of
general climates of frustration in
the Third World to a specific act of
rebellion? Why assume that the
McGee's of the US are dangerous
charlatans at best while the Abu
Bakr's of the Caribbean are potential liberators? Is it not true that

the difference between the threats
of McGee and those uttered for the
past five years by Trinidad's Abu
Bakr are differences in physical
capabilities, not in depth of resentment and rebellious intent? Is it
not true that the right of any
democratic government to expect
obedience should not be confused
with the capacity of that government to enforce such obedience?
Is it not a plausible proposition
that since both McGee and Abu
Bakr claim their attitudes and postures stem from alienation, deprivation, and moral indignation, that
their violent intentions should be
judged in the same terms? These
questions are especially relevant
since only a daring person would
argue that the US is a more
democratic or less racist society
than Trinidad.

Political Motives
Neither an opportunistic moral
code nor simple socioeconomic arguments explain either the anger
of urban American blacks or the
events in Trinidad. After all, that island has, comparatively speaking, a
high standard of living and of social welfare. Judged in terms of
rates of infant mortality, longevity,
and literacy--critical measures of
development and social equityTrinidad compares well with the
much-touted Cuban case. Its income is better distributed than
Mexico's or Venezuela's, indeed,
even than Costa Rica's. If economic conditions explain Abu Bakr's actions, why are there no Abu Bakr's
in those countries? The reason is
that Abu Bakr-type events are not
merely spontaneous responses to
temporary economic conditions or
even a given government. They are
conspiracies against a system of
government. This explains why he
began buying arms and training his
men in Libya years ago.
It is time US journalists and
congressional representatives call
things by their names, whether
they occur in the US or in a Third
World democracy. .
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Soul Sport
by Abelardo Sdnchez-Leon

Flexible Specialization
tory that the seeds of soccer took root not in
North America but in
South America. What germinated in the lower
geographic tier of the New World
was less a sport than a compelling
feature of everyday life: a cultural
expression of personal, social, and
national aspirations.
During the 19th century soccer
was primarily a sport of Europe's
working classes. It arrived in South
America aboard British ships and
became a major recreational activity in the port cities as they began
to modernize with British assistance. The sport soon spread to
remote mining camps in Andean
cities like Cerro de Pasco and
Huancavelica in Peru and La Paz
in Bolivia. These Andean enclaves,
which were once part of the colonial trade routes of silver and mercury, were being revitalized by
British railways that connected the
mines with Peruvian ports.
The essence of British soccerwhite skin and tired blue eyes-was
replaced by local traits. The new
players and fans were the mestizos
of the Andes and beyond; the
blacks of the Colombian, Ecuadoran, Peruvian, and Brazilian
coasts; and the poor, barefoot
Italians who were arriving in
Buenos Aires and Montevideo.
These are the coals and fire that
burn today in the soul sport of
South American life.

Abelardo Sdnchez-Leon, a former
Guggenheimfellow, is research director
of the Division de Investigacionesat the
Centro de Estudiosy Promocion del
Desarrolloand a professorat the Universidad Catolica, in Lima.
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Though created by the conservative British, soccer nimbly eludes
the straitjacket of rules. Not surprising, then, is its supreme adaptability to local conditions-to
differences in social composition
and culture, economic development, and even the physical stature
of people. Swimmers and runners,
for instance, are alone in their
rigidly defined space, pushing

themselves beyond their physical
limitations, calling upon their internal reserves of endurance and training. Soccer players, in contrast,
blend their individual efforts as a
loosely woven team on an expansive field. While physical talent is
important, the faults of any one
player can be offset by the assets of
another, and more valuable than
brute strength, speed, or able strategy is a knack for improvisation.

Elfctbol demands neither endless
hours of instruction nor expensive
infrastructure; healthy legs, a ball,
and a desire to kick it are enough

to play.
With fluidity and improvisation
comes uncertainty. And with uncertainty comes surprise-no less in
soccer than in the endless villas
miseriasof South America. A
population accustomed to uncertainty seems to expect the suspension of science and logic during
the 90 magical minutes of a soccer
game. Anything can happen; and
poor nations can beat wealthy nations. Indeed, street wisdom has it
that poverty-with its growthstunted bodies and undereducated
minds-generates a spirit of agility
and resilience that, with the right
footing, can outmaneuver the rich
and powerful.
Such convictions are deeply
etched into the psyche of Peruvians, for example, whose collective
memory still resonates with the
cheers of Peru's convincing 1959
victory over England in Lima.
Similarly remembered is the 1978
World Cup triumph over Scotland
in Argentina. In that game the
Peruvian team deflated the First
World ego of the Scottish players
and coach, who, having snickered
at their Andean rivals, paid the
price for an ill-advised night on the
town.
But these victories involved
something more than the international assertion of Third World
pride. Soccer is played in few of
Peru's elite private schools. Rarely,
then, do the white-skinned upper
classes play as amateurs. And with
one exception-Alfredo Tomasini,
who died along with the rest of the
immensely popular Alianza Lima in
a 1987 plane crash-they never

R

play as professionals. The playing
of the sport and the defense of the
national jersey are left to mestizos
and blacks, for whom soccer is
much more than recreation.
Though ethnic patterns vary,
the class structure of soccer is
similar throughout South America.
Yet by no means do all of the
region's countries share Peru's
humble posture on the international soccer circuit. In striking contrast, Brazil (a three-time winner of
the World Cup), Argentina (twice
victorious), and soccer power
Uruguay stand as shining testaments to Latin America's broader
aspirations and potential.
Since the US becomes rather
minuscule on the soccer field,
South America's extra-regional soccer sights are set on Europe. The
World Cup, of course, is the principal arena for this test of forces. In
fact, Argentina's military defeat by
England in the Falklands was
avenged in the 1986 Cup in
Mexico-on Latin American turf,
no less-with Diego Armando

T

Maradona leading the heroic
charge. Maradona not only scored
a goal after eluding eight British
opponents, but scored a second
time with the help of, as he put it,
"the hand of God." For Argentines
as well as millions of other Latin
Americans, pride was restored.
National pride is just as hotly
contested at the regional level as it
is in the World Cup. According to
Paulo Schilling, Uruguay's relationship with Brazil is an exemplary
case. The Uruguayan economy,
like most of the other Southern
Cone economies, is the object of
substantial investment by Brazilians, a trend that exacerbates longstanding Uruguayan-Brazilian
tensions. Whenever Uruguay conquers Brazil on the soccer field, the
emotions unleashed represent not
so much a sports triumph as a
nationalist vindication.

S

why, we might speculate, has soccer
not taken root there? Consider
Oliver Stone's movie, Born on the
Fourth ofJuly (1989), which portrays
a small-town high school athlete
who enlists to fight in Vietnam.
Like a quarterback rallying his
team in the game's waning moments, the soldier throws himself
into the war effort, marching his
squad ahead with swaggering confidence. Truth is victory and victory
goes to the team "willing to pay the
price."
This clear, confident vision is
alien to the soccer field. There improvisation prevails, the best teams
frequently lose in penalty-kick
shoot-outs, and an honorable tie
(or even defeat) is often cause for
celebration. At the 1990 World
Cup in Italy, the US got a firsthand
look at the heart, weapons, and
ways of Latin America and the rest
of the world. .

The Other America
Given that the 1994 World Cup is
scheduled to take place in the US,

(Translatedby Deborah Rosenberg)
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Misreading Colombia
by Alex Wilde

drugs" in the Andes is a
textbook case of domestically driven foreign policy. Such policy gathers
momentum because it is
popular-in this case, with beleaguered urban politicians, rightwing xenophobes, and Southern
Command strategists. Ultimately,
however, it must be judged not
only by the support it receives from
domestic constituencies but by the
consequences reported at the place
where it is applied. By this standard
the Bush administration is embarking on a dangerous course in
Colombia-potentially harmful
both to human rights and democracy in that country and to the best
interests of the US.

abrupt increase in aid it may be
higher.
Military aid has entangled the
US in the Colombian military's brutal counterinsurgency campaign.
Following a military offensive by
the FuerzasArmadas Revolucionarias
de Colombia and the Ejercito de
LiberacionNacionalin the fall of

The US War on Drugs
The most dangerous aspect of the
US antinarcotics policy toward
Colombia is its military component. Since 1988 US military and
police aid to Colombia has grown
dramatically. In addition to the
growth of direct aid, antinarcotics
legislation allowed the ExportImport Bank to guarantee $200 million in private loans in 1989 to the
Ministerio de Defensa Nacionalfor the
purchase of US military equipment. The number of US military
personnel in Colombia is confidential, but it was reported at the end
of 1989 to be 85, and given the

Alex Wilde is directorof the Washington Office on Latin America. He is
co-editor (with Scott Mainwaring)of
The Progressive Church in Latin
America (University ofNotre Dame
Press, 1989).
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1989, the armed forces stepped up
aerial bombing of suspected guerrilla strongholds. According to the
Jesuit research center CINEP, in
February 1990, A-37 airplanes and
helicopters bombed and strafed
the community of Llana Fria in
San Vicente de Chucuri (Santander province), forcing more
than 1,400 peasants to flee their
homes and seek refuge in San
Vicente, Barrancabermeja, and
Bucaramanga. Similar bombing
has been reported in villages in the
Urab.i, Yond6, and Meta regions.

Witnesses maintain that the attacks were not aimed at guerrilla
camps, as the military claimed, but
at civilian settlements. Eight A-37s
were part of the $65-million US aid
package. Witnesses of the bombardments have also sighted Blackhawk
helicopters, which the Colombian
armed forces purchased through
the Pentagon with their 1989
Export-Import Bank guaranteed
loans.
The US has chosen to address
its national drug problem with a
strategy that is fundamentally
flawed in two respects: it is directed
disproportionately toward the Andean supply countries, and it is
conceived disproportionately in
military terms. The Bush administration has shown a welcome awareness of some of the limitations of
the supply-side approach, but the
subject still merits congressional
debate. Although prone to temporary fluctuations, the acreage
planted to coca has grown enormously since 1980. And hardheaded military analysts admit the
US would be fortunate to stop 10%
of what would otherwise enter.
Of greatest concern, however, is
the preponderant role assigned to
the military in the so-called "war on
drugs." In recent years there has
been a dangerous erosion of many
of the safeguards the US Congress
erected to maintain the democratic
accountability of the US armed
forces in their actions abroad. The
Andean war on drugs could accelerate that erosion. In 1986 President
Ronald Reagan signed a secret
directive that made international
narcotics trafficking a matter of national security. In 1989 President
Bush agreed to allow US military
advisers to go into drug-producing
limited
zones,, an arena previouslv
t
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to US civilian personnel. The
"rules of engagement" have recently been relaxed for US military personnel in such situations. The
retiring CIA general counsel RussellJ. Bruemmer noted in April
1990 that Executive Order 12333,
which binds US Special Operations
Forces and forbids assassinations
overseas, has been reinterpreted to
mean that "force may be used under the doctrine of anticipatory selfdefense to attack terrorist targets."
The Southern Command in
Panama is reportedly planning to
extrapolate to the Andes the military lessons of the "Just Cause" invasion of December 1989. It is by
no means inconceivable, then, that
US forces will soon be directly engaged in active combat in the
Andes.
Likewise worrisome is a growing
tendency to lump antinarcotics activity in with counterinsurgency.
This tendency has implications for
both the role of US personnel and
the use of US equipment by foreign militaries. In the latter regard,
the effectiveness of past controls
on foreign military forces is not
reassuring. For example, a September 1989 General Accounting Office report on Burma found that
the State Department had not
been able to ensure that US aircraft were not used for counterinsurgency purposes. The line
between antinarcotics and counterinsurgency warfare has already
been blurred for Peru (which
might "further US antinarcotics
objectives") and for Guatemala
(where the US has worked with
that country's military intelligence
to pursue alleged drug traffickers).
Will this also happen in Colombia?
The militarized concept of US
policy ignores three fundamental
aspects of Colombian reality. First,
it overlooks how drug-related
violence fits into the social panorama of Colombian violence, in
particular the sinister alliance between the traffickers' paramilitary
death squads and members of the
state security forces. Second, it
ignores the Colombian gov-

ZUELA
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ernment's degree of responsibility
for the country's human rights
emergency, through failure to control members of its own military
and police. And third, it does not
address the 30-year expansion of
the power and autonomy of the
Colombian armed forces, which
undermines democratic accountability and destabilizes the political
system by blocking greatly needed
reforms.

Colombia's Drug Violence
Colombia's some 170 years of independence encompass both the
longest tradition of elected civilian
government in Latin America and
the bloodiest history of recurrent
violence in the hemisphere.
During the so-called "Violencia"
(1946-58), violent deaths numbered at least 180,000. During the
1960s and '70s, the failures of
Colombian social reform and the
violent challenge of revolutionary

guerrillas fueled a progressive
militarization of Colombian life.
It is of utmost importance that
US policy comprehend this legacy,
which frames the rise of drugrelated violence. The drug cartels
are only the most recent draft from
a much deeper cup.
By virtually all measures, Colombia is experiencing one of the
world's worst human rights emergencies. Understanding its dimensions and character is a complex
but essential task. To begin with,
violent death in Colombia is appallingly common: in 1988 there were
20,129 homicides (in a population
of some 31 million), and murder
ranks as the most frequent cause of
death for males between the ages
of 15 and 45. What is more, Colombia is in the midst of a guerrilla insurgency: 732 soldiers, police,
guerrillas, and civilians were killed
in combat situations in 1989. And
the Colombian government is confronted by the violence of the drug

Hemisphere . Summer 1990
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cartels: according to the New York
Times (June 3, 1990) in 1989 the
cocaine mafia was responsible for
385 deaths.
Though Colombia has a long history of violent criminal activity, the
drug cartels emerged as a political
force in the early 1980s. US
policymakers have made much of
the so-called "narco-guerrilla" connection, an alleged alliance between drug traffickers and armed
revolutionaries to overthrow electoral democracy.
Far more important, however, is
the alliance forged between the
drug mafias and the extreme rightwing elements among large landowners, economic elites, and
members of the Colombian
security forces. The first of the
modern Colombian death squads-the so-called "Muerte a Secuestradores" ("Death to Kidnappers")-was
formed by the Medellin cartel in
1981 as a reaction to a favorite guerrilla tactic. Since then, these
paramilitary groups, and cartelfinanced hit men (sicarios), have
proliferated. Among their targets
have been judges, mayors, and
other government officials, as well
as the prominent political figures
whose assassinations have made
the US evening news. Yet, most
striking in terms of the numbers is
how many of their victims have
been the leaders and members of
the legal political left.
The new criminal elite created
by cocaine wealth clearly feels
threatened by the growing strength
of the Colombian left. The cocaine
capitalists have become the largest
landholding class in the country.
They now own about 12% of the
country's productive land, much of
it concentrated in huge cattle
ranches where paramilitary training schools have been set up for
right-wing death squads. These
"narco-cattlemen," often in collaboration with local army officers,
have clashed with leftist guerrilla
groups as well as with peasant and
farm worker unions demanding
land reform and higher wages. As
analyst Merrill Collett has put it,
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when leftists are murdered, "the
mafia supplies the money [to hire
gunmen], the military the arms,
and members of the local elites an
air of legitimacy" (The Nation,
August 13-20, 1988). The Colombian government itself has documented this "triangle of terror," as
for example in the March 1988 massacre of 22 union leaders on a
banana plantation in the Urabfi
region. The frightening firepower
of Colombia's drug mafias is not
allied with the guerrillas, but is
directed rather against those in
trade unions, political parties, and
popular movements who are working for fundamental social reform.

through militarization have themselves become a principal cause of
instability by thwarting peaceful
and democratic change.
Fortunately, new president
C6sar Gaviria has spoken out
against paramilitary activity and
proclaimed his support for political
reconciliation and change. There
is also promise in the May 1990
electoral showing of M-19's
Antonio Navarro Wolf, who
courageously chose to compete
even though the two previous
presidential candidates of the left,
BernardoJaramillo and Carlos
Pizarro, were assassinated. If M-19
can indeed make the transition
from armed struggle to political
competition, it could promote a
more coherent, pluralistic, and
responsive political system.

Human Rights and the State

Civil-Military Relations
Historically the Colombian military
stood in sharp contrast to its counterparts in much of the rest of
Latin America as a small force, marginal to its nation's political life.
Nevertheless, the Violencia and the
counterinsurgency warfare of the
last 30 years have transformed the
military into a central and increasingly autonomous political actor.
For decades every Colombian president has at some point faced open
defiance by his minister of defense
(who is drawn from within the
armed forces). Since the late
1970s, however, public challenges
to civilian authority have become
more aggressive. Though none of
these conflicts has led to a military
coup d'etat, the pattern of governance has become more militarized. In a perverse way the
ingrained habits of repression

Perhaps the most important aspect
of Colombia's human rights emergency is that drug-related violence
represents only a part of it: the misguided emphasis on drug-related
violence by US media and policymakers is the premise of fundamentally misdirected policy. The 385
deaths attributed to the drug mafias in 1989 must be seen against
the much larger total of at least
2,479 deaths and disappearances in
the same year due to noncombat
political causes. Narcoterrorism is
indeed tragic, but it is dwarfed by
politically based violence.
Colombian officials often point
to drug traffickers and guerrillas as
the agents of violence, portraying
the government itself as a victim.
The government, though, has
failed to control its own agents in
the military and police forces.
Hence the Colombian government
bears responsibility for human
rights violations not only against
civilians during guerrilla-military
conflicts, but also against political
opponents and campaigners for
social reform.
Military and police complicity in
paramilitary activity has been documented by Colombian government

sources and human rights groups
and by the 1989 US State Department Human Rights Report. The
Colombian military high command
denies the involvement of the
armed forces in human rights violations, but has a long record of
obstructing the legitimate investigations undertaken by other government agencies. According to the
State Department report, 84 officers were dismissed from the
armed forces in the first eight
months of 1989, most of them for
association with drug traffickers, involvement with rightist paramilitary
groups, or violations of human
rights.
A few egregious cases have been
turned over to civilian courts. In
theory, the Colombian supreme
court has established that civilian
courts have jurisdiction to try mem-

bers of the military and police
responsible for human rights violations. In practice, virtually all such
cases continue to be heard within
the military court system. The few
cases brought to civilian courts languish in disturbing parallel to El
Salvador. In the words of the State
Department report, "Punishment
for human rights abuses within the
military judicial system seldom extends beyond dismissal from the
service.... In the immediate future . .. there appears to be little
prospect of effective action by
judges of the weak civilian judicial
system." In sum, the Colombian
military judges itself.

US Policy and Colombian Reform
The military is the chosen instrument of US policy to fight Colom-

bia's drug mafias. It is, however,
the wrong instrument. If the
Colombian government is to have
any chance against the drug mafias, it must win deeper public support by carrying out fundamental
political and social reforms-calling on the commitment, creativity,
and courage of democrats across
the political spectrum. Such support will be obtained only if the
government honestly faces its
responsibility for the country's
human rights emergency and augments its efforts to hold the armed
forces accountable. US military aid
undermines that possibility by
strengthening the autonomy of the
Colombian armed forces. And, in
the name of combating "narcoguerrillas," such aid threatens to
draw the US into a counterinsurgency war in the Andes. .
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Sustaining the Harvest
by Richard Reed

areas are suffering from
massive and intensive
land development. Ranching, commercial agriculture, and colonization
schemes are clearing the forests to
accommodate the land needs of
peasants and the foreign-exchange
needs of governments. The outcome of this transformation remains undetermined, but as the
trees are felled for pasture and cotton fields, evidence mounts that
the green forests are being permanently reduced to red deserts.
The low rolling hills of eastern
Paraguay are covered by one of the
last of South America's virgin subtropical deciduous forests. The region harbors a diverse biosphere,
important as a refuge for large
mammals such as the giant armadillo and the jaguar and for a variety of unclassified fauna. These
forests are also the home of more
than 15,000 Guarani Indians, the
remnants of a much larger population that once stretched across the
southern half of the continent,
from the Andes to the Atlantic
Ocean. Although the Guarani have
survived five centuries of European
settlement, present-day land development threatens their future.
Ironically environmentalists, in
their search for models of sustainable development to protect the
remaining forest, are turning to indigenous peoples for answers.

Richard Reed is assistantprofessorof
anthropologyat Trinity University, in
San Antonio, Texas. As part of his
work with CulturalSurvival, Inc., of
Cambridge,Massachusetts, he is analyzing development and indigenouspeople
in eastern Paraguay.
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The Guarani harvest a wild tea,
yerba mate, for sale to international markets. Commercial yerba production began after the Spanish
conquest in the 16th century and
merchants were soon traveling into
the farthest reaches of what is now
Paraguay. Despite centuries of extensive harvesting, the extraction
of the leaf did not harm the forest
cover and had little impact on the
diverse flora and fauna. Moreover,

yerba production did not displace
the Guarani from their forests and
communities. They integrated commercial tea extraction into indigenous hunting and agricultural
systems, allowing them the economic autonomy to maintain a distinct social organization and ethnic
identity. As a model for future development in the area, such commercial extraction could protect
both the forest and the Guarani.

Intensive Development
State-sponsored, large-scale development in eastern Paraguay is
designed to provide land and

profit to colonists and investors.
New roads bring settlers and provide transport for new commercial
activities. Rather than initiate land
reform in the country's heavily settled areas, government colonization schemes are pulling nonIndian campesinos to this frontier
area. The forests are being divided
into 20 hectare plots and assigned
to colonists, who are producing cotton to earn the money necessary to
purchase land titles.
Agroindustries are contributing
to this rapid and rapacious transformation. Fields of thousands of hectares are being planted in soybean
and cotton for the international
markets. Ranches are cutting into
the forests at an even faster rate,
creating pastures of more than
10,000 hectares in the wilderness.
Between 1975 and 1980 alone the
total area of eastern Paraguay under crops and pasture increased by
110%, destroying 876,000 hectares
or 20% of the forests.
This transformation is devastating the region's wildlife. Deer
and pig are hunted for food and
jaguar and other rare mammals are
trapped for their skins. The flora is
suffering as well. Forest timber is
sold off, even in areas not cleared
for planting. Valuable hardwoods
are hauled off to mills and the
remaining timber is split for fence
posts and firewood. The forest
canopy is being destroyed and the
number of remaining plant and
animal species is being reduced by
exposure to sun and rain.
Such development has been
equally harsh on the zone's human
inhabitants, the Guarani, most of
whose land is summarily expropriated by the government and
turned over to private enterprises.
The Stroessner government took

steps to set aside land for the
Guarani only after criticism by
anthropologists such as Miguel
Chase-Sardi and Bartomeu Melii,
by groups such as Survival International (England) and Cultural Survival (US), and by the Carter
administration (1976-80). Even
then, the Guarani communities
were offered the same size plots offered to non-Indian peasants. This
policy ensures that the Guarani engage in intensive commercial agriculture similar to that of campesinos.
Land development and confinement to reservations directly
threaten the sustainable commercial economy of the Guarani. For
one thing, 20 hectare parcels provide no forest expanses for commercial production. For another,
the Guarani attempt to compensate for the loss of tea profits by
planting cash crops. Surveys show
that, in three communities confined to reservations, gardens have
grown by an average of 40% as the
Guarani begin to plant cotton.
This trend increases the amount of

forest cleared and forces them into
a destructive spiral, as the apparent
answer to their economic desperation exacerbates their plight. The
result could well be similar to that
of the Paraguayan peasants, who
purchase inputs such as seed and
pesticide to produce cotton, which
then destroys the soil and renders
producers increasingly indebted to
an exploitative world market.
Worse still, the current form of
development could prove unsustainable. Despite access to new
land and high profits from the first
crops in the forest, there are indications that the fragile soil resources
of the region will not support intensive commercial development.
Above all, rain and sun quickly
break down the thin topsoils. Small
farmers on similar lands in the
Brazilian state of Parani have
found that production and profits
decline rapidly after the first years,
and thus they are fleeing north to
the states of Rond6nia and Acre.
Recent anthropological research
calls attention to traditional re-

source management by the Guarani and suggests that they could
provide an alternative model for
development in eastern Paraguay:
a model that promises to foster sustainable commercial profits without degrading forests.

Biosphere Reserve
The Guarani are in a unique situation to illustrate the rationality of
their indigenous economy. Efforts
are under way to preserve the
region's flora and fauna as a biosphere reserve. Since the Guarani
are a critical part of this environment, their traditional land-use patterns are being integrated into this
regional plan, while providing
them with a sustainable source of
commercial profits.
In 1970 an extensive area of
forest called Mbaracayu was purchased by an entrepreneur, not for
the harvesting ofyerba mate but
for lumbering and speculative purposes, and was used as collateral
for World Bank loans. When the
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operation went bankrupt in 1974,
the International Finance Corporation of the World Bank found itself
holding title to more than 55,000
hectares of primary forest. By 1989
the World Bank, having never located a purchaser interested in the
entire parcel, became willing to collaborate with an international environmental group, the Nature
Conservancy, to establish a biosphere reserve. Looking for a debtfor-nature swap, the government of
General Andres Rodriguez, which
succeeded the Stroessner dictatorship in 1989, has expressed strong
support for the plan.
Anthropologists have been enlisted by the Nature Conservancy
and the Inter-American Foundation to adapt indigenous production systems to a long-term model
for resource management of the
area, which has considerable potential for sustained yields of yerba.
The zone has been the most fertile
of the natural yerba forests and the
home to at least nine distinct yerba
fields. In the early 1900s an average
of 25,000 kilograms of tea were harvested annually from the area. At
current market rates of more than
a dollar per kilo, this harvest would
yield $250,000 per year.
The 400 Guarani families located near the land have title to
small reservations that are suitable
for agriculture but insufficient for
hunting or commercial production. Anthropologists suggest that
these communities be provided
rights to commercial yerba gathering on Mbaracayu land, supplementing their subsistence gardens
on their own lands. Rights to other
uses of the biosphere reserve will
remain restricted, since the Guarani could drastically alter the
forest if provided unrestricted
gardening rights. Gathering tea
from the land could provide cash
to relieve the dependence of the
Guarani families on cotton production, thereby slowing the pace of
forest clearing for agriculture and
allowing traditional slash-and-burn
systems to keep pace with gardening.
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Such production is well suited to
the labor resources of the Guarani.
The harvesting of yerba is labor,
not capital, intensive, and the annual cycle of agricultural work,
peaking in August and September,
integrates well with the peak yerba
harvest from March to June. Further, the Guarani have traditionally
harvested the leaf as members of
teams based on kinship and
household. These teams can be
drawn from extant communities,
forming a social structure to coordinate the administration of labor
and the allocation of profits.
Traditional social relations
within and between communities
may provide the structure for the
marketing of yerba as well. Currently five Guarani communities are
loosely affiliated with each other.
What they lack, however, is a formal mechanism that will allow for
effective political action or
economic cooperation. Yerba

6 QTE

production would necessitate the
formation of a regional federation
of Guarani communities to administer the transportation and sale of
yerba from Mbaracayu.
The production of yerba,
then, could permit the Guarani
to maintain an economy that preserves their distinct social organization and ethnic identity. Moreover,
it could provide the Guarani with
the impetus to form a regional
agency to defend their economic
interests in the regional economy
and their legal and political interests in the national sphere. Finally,
Mbaracayu could provide a model
for wresting sustainable profits
from forested regions without
degrading the forest environment.
Commercial development does
not inevitably destroy the forests, as
the Guarani have demonstrated for
centuries. Perhaps we can learn
from them before it is too late. .
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Nicaragua: Staying the Course
by Luis Guillermo Solis

electoral defeat of the
Sandinistas by the
Union Nacional Opositora

After

(UNO) on February 25,
the overwhelming

1990, Nicaragua came
to symbolize Central America's
Esquipulas vision of "ballots for
bullets." UNO's decisive victory
demonstrated that popular sovereignty can be effectively expressed
in free and fair elections if the
secrecy of the vote is guaranteed.
Unfortunately, however, Nicaragua's antidemocratic legacy of
dictatorship, intervention, and
violence are proving to be formidable obstacles to the country's
democratic transition.

A Divided Household
Political rifts are wider within the
14-party UNO coalition than between it and the Sandinista party, a
problem that dates from the coalition's hasty amalgamation in
mid-1989. The parties within the
coalition range from communist to
conservative, and since the February elections their quarrels are anything but muted.
A focal point of this disunity is
the feud that pits Minister of the
Presidency Antonio Lacayo and
Congress Secretary Alfredo Cesar,
two pragmatists who advocate moderation in the government's rela-

Luis Guillermo Solis, formerly chief of
staff of the Costa Rican Ministeriode
Relaciones Exteriores, is on thefaculty
ofFloridaInternationalUniversity's El
Centropara la AdministraciondeJusticia, in San Jose, Costa Rica. Responsibilityfor the views expressed lies solely
with the author and not with El Centro
para la Administracion deusticia.

tions with the Sandinistas, against
Vice President Virgilio Godoy and
UNO's Consejo Politico, whose

stance is confrontational. The
moderates scored an early major
victory when they negotiated a preinaugural agreement between the
incoming administration of Violeta
Chamorro and the outgoing administration of Daniel Ortega,
who, with his brother Humberto,
has a stake in marginalizing Sandinista hardliners such as Bayardo
Arce and Tomis Borge.
In setting the ground rules for
the transfer of power, the agreement assured the Sandinistas that
the Chamorro government would
not dismantle key programs such
as agrarian reform. In addition it
called for the demobilization of the
contra, a major reduction in the
size of the Sandinista army without
the reorganization of its command
structure, and the transformation
of the dreaded Ministerio del Interior

into the civilian-oriented Ministerio
de Gobernacion.Yet, according to

the agreement's opponents within
the UNO coalition, it was merely
part of a larger, secret scheme to
establish a co-gobiernowith the Sandinistas, including the continued
presence of Humberto Ortega as
the highest ranking officer in the
armed forces. Further developments, particularly the two Sandinista-organized labor strikes in
May and July against the government's harsh austerity program,
show that a mass-based party structure keeps the Sandinistas afloat as
Nicaragua's principal power
broker. Not surprisingly, however,
such developments have strengthened the resolve of anti-Sandinista
hardliners.
At the height ofJuly's strike,
Vice President Godoy, together

with a group of UNO notables and
with backing by the Consejo Superior
de la Empresa Privada(COSEP), announced the creation of the Comite
parala Salvaci6n Nacional,supposedly to prevent the onset of anarchy.
Though President Chamorro immediately rebuked the Comiti,its
creation sent shock waves through
the political establishment. The
Sandinistas condemned the initiative as a "civilian coup" aimed at undermining Chamorro's authority,
especially since it proposed the formation of a "parallel cabinet" under vice-presidential control.
Neither the end of the strike
nor the Godoy group's eventual
political retreat stabilized the
Chamorro administration's underpinnings. Both COSEP and UNO's
Consejo Politicostridently criticized
the administration's concessions to
organized labor, including the
suspension of the program to
return land to its former owners.
The administration, they argued,
had become a prisoner to the Sandinistas.
Not that the Sandinistas themselves are exempt from such discord: the labor strikes also brought
to the surface conflicts between the
party's pragmatic and radical factions. When the Sandinistas assembled in May to assess the
electoral results and discuss the
party's future, the pragmatists, led
by the Ortega brothers, called for
the democratization of the party.
They called as well for the forging
of a "constructive" relationship
with the ruling sectors of UNO,
whose importance to Nicaragua's
"democratic conquests" they acknowledged. In contrast the radicals argued for the preservation of
the Direcci6n Nacionalas the Sandinistas' highest and unquestioned
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ruling body. They maintained that
the Chamorro government should
be opposed relentlessly, and that
the Sandinistas must "govern from
below"-a phrase coined, ironically, by Daniel Ortega himself. While
the pragmatists seem to have the
upper hand, their advantage is
tenuous in light of Nicaraguan uncertainties.
In short, the Chamorro administration is not only grappling
with the problems of imposing a
severe austerity program on one of
the hemisphere's most underdeveloped economies. It is simultaneously embroiled in conflicts at
both ends of the political spectrum: with the UNO coalition's strident anti-Sandinista factions, and
with the radical wing of the Sandinista party. What makes the
governing clique's position especially precarious is that neither
Chamorro nor her closest allies,
Antonio Lacayo and Alfredo Cesar,
can count on the support of any
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broadly based partisan organization.

Building Institutions
If democracy is to survive in
Nicaragua, the politics of personalism must somehow be superseded by the politics of institutions.
Chamorro's first steps in this direction have centered on the demobilization of the contra, the reduction
of the army's size, and the depoliticization of the police force by
replacing the Ministerio del Interior
with the Ministerio de Gobernacion.
The consolidation of these measures is crucial.
Reinforcing Chamorro's efforts
has been the official support of the
Sandinistas, based on the dominance of that party's moderates.
Unfortunately, however, Central
America's climate of disarmament
has not been as favorable. So far,
Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras have expressed commitment

to only minor reductions in the
size of their armies. As a result the
Nicaraguan government is willing
to disarm merely to the point of
"reasonable" balance with its neighbors.
Similarly important, if much less
discussed, is the strengthening of
Nicaragua's judicial system, historically a weak, highly partisan set of
institutions. The strengthening of
the judicial system would widen
channels for the negotiation of conflicts and enhance the state's legitimacy. Nevertheless, such reform
requires much more consensus
than exists among political contenders regarding the interests and
form of a rebuilt state. Secondarily
it requires much more international aid than is available for professionalization, staffing, and other
technical and material needs.
The euphoria of UNO's electoral victory is now but a dim memory.
The challenge ahead is to stay the
course from bullets to ballots. a

Reports: Chile

Chile Markets Its Economy
by Edward Glab

n most of Latin America the
1980s were a decade of declining investment and economic
growth, shrinking per capita income, swelling external debt,
and escalating inflation.
Against this dismal backdrop, the
economic success of Chile stands
in stark contrast.
While the Soviet Union and
Eastern Europe are only recent
converts to the gospel according to
Adam Smith, Chilean economists
have been preaching the blessings
of a free-market economy for years.
The conversions have been many
and the results miraculous. Even
the political left in Chile has
embraced many of the structural

economy. In addition, it adopted
macroeconomic and fiscal policies
that encouraged investor confidence, particularly in areas where
Chile enjoys natural advantages for
developing exports, as in mining
and renewable resources such as
fish, fruit, and forestry products.
Much of Chile's future growth
will continue to be financed by
foreign investment in exportoriented industries, which are expected to expand by 10-15%
annually well into the 1990s. The
traditional mining sector, for example, is experiencing a boom,
with major projects representing
more than $2 billion in Asian,
European, and US investments.

democracies. In any case, the
Chilean model has continued to
prosper and attract investors under
the current Christian Democratic
administration of President
Patricio Aylwin.
Of course, factors outside the
marketplace help to explain the
success of free enterprise in Chile.
For instance, Chile is relatively free
of corruption. Its government agencies assist foreign investors in overcoming obstacles, instead of
creating them. And it possesses a
well-educated, hard-working labor
pool that is largely untouched by
xenophobia.
Perhaps most important of all,
the success of Chile's economic
''
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Latin American economies worsened under authoritarian regimes.
Moreover, the world's most successful free-market economies-North
America, Western Europe, and
Japan-are also its most stable
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give the administration a reasonable chance to maintain a stable,
effective government over the next
four years, and to continue to attract domestic and foreign investors. .
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The euphoria of UNO's electoral victory is now but a dim memory.
The challenge ahead is to stay the
course from bullets to ballots. .
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Chile Markets Its Economy
by Edward Glab

n most of Latin America the
1980s were a decade of declining investment and economic
growth, shrinking per capita income, swelling external debt,
and escalating inflation.
Against this dismal backdrop, the
economic success of Chile stands
in stark contrast.
While the Soviet Union and
Eastern Europe are only recent
converts to the gospel according to
Adam Smith, Chilean economists
have been preaching the blessings
of a free-market economy for years.
The conversions have been many
and the results miraculous. Even
the political left in Chile has
embraced many of the structural
and macroeconomic reforms begun under former finance minister
Hernan Buchi. Many international
investors regard Chile's business
climate today as the most attractive
in Latin America and its economy
as the best run.

Economic Goals

l

The goals of Chile's economic
model were to boost exports, increase domestic savings, and reduce the foreign debt. The country
succeeded in all three, in part due
to external factors in the late 1980s
such as high copper prices, low international oil prices, and moderate interest rates. However, the
major reason for Chile's success
has been its reliance on the private
sector and de-emphasis of the
state's role in managing the

Edward Glab, a formerFulbrightprofessor at the Universidadde Chile, is a
public affairs and political analystfor
a multinationalfirm.

economy. In addition, it adopted
macroeconomic and fiscal policies
that encouraged investor confidence, particularly in areas where
Chile enjoys natural advantages for
developing exports, as in mining
and renewable resources such as
fish, fruit, and forestry products.
Much of Chile's future growth
will continue to be financed by
foreign investment in exportoriented industries, which are expected to expand by 10-15%
annually well into the 1990s. The
traditional mining sector, for example, is experiencing a boom,
with major projects representing
more than $2 billion in Asian,
European, and US investments.
Fish, fruit, and forestry product
exports, which form the core of
Chile's nontraditional export sector, also continue to expand at impressive rates.

Continued Success?
Nonetheless, some doubting Thomases question whether Chile's freemarket model can continue its
success following the demise of
General Augusto Pinochet's regime (1973-90). It was under his
authoritarian administration that
membership in labor unions fell by
about two-thirds. While some investors may indeed have been attracted to Chile by Pinochet's
"rules of the game," it does not follow that authoritarianism is either
a necessary or sufficient condition
for the success of a free-market
model. During the 1980s many
Latin American economies worsened under authoritarian regimes.
Moreover, the world's most successful free-market economies-North
America, Western Europe, and
Japan-are also its most stable

democracies. In any case, the
Chilean model has continued to
prosper and attract investors under
the current Christian Democratic
administration of President
Patricio Aylwin.
Of course, factors outside the
marketplace help to explain the
success of free enterprise in Chile.
For instance, Chile is relatively free
of corruption. Its government agencies assist foreign investors in overcoming obstacles, instead of
creating them. And it possesses a
well-educated, hard-working labor
pool that is largely untouched by
xenophobia.
Perhaps most important of all,
the success of Chile's economic
model has narrowed the differences among political groups
regarding structural reform and
macroeconomic policy. To be sure,
political differences remain concerning labor reform and government spending on health and
social welfare. There is consensus,
however, that dramatic reversals in
macroeconomic policy are unnecessary. This consensus has been
bolstered by recent world developments, notably the end of the Cold
War and recognition by Eastern
Europe and the Soviet Union of
the economic superiority of free
enterprise.
A spirit of compromise among
Chilean political groups, from
right to left, has enhanced President Aylwin's ability to forge a consensus. The ideological breadth of
the government coalition and its
leadership by a skilled negotiator
give the administration a reasonable chance to maintain a stable,
effective government over the next
four years, and to continue to attract domestic and foreign investors. .
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Insider briefs on people and institutions
shaping Latin American and Caribbean affairs

Deals and Ideals

Left Out?

Courtesy of Hollywood

What's happened to the Chico
Mendes Foundation, the legacy of
the Brazilian union leader and environmental activist who was murdered in 1989? Intense Hollywood
bargaining for the movie rights to
the Chico Mendes story has caused
equally intense infighting to rip
through the organization. The
main source of agitation is Ilzamar
Mendes-the activist's 24-year-old
widow-who, coincidentally, has become suddenly affluent as a result
of the competition. She, in turn, accuses other Brazilian and US environmentalists of profiting from
Hollywood's interest (The Miami
Herald,August 26, 1990). But all
sides have good words for British
producer David Puttnam (Chariots
of Fire, The Killing Fields), who plans
to begin filming in mid-1991.

The field of Latin American studies
is left-leaning and marginal to the
policy world. So argues William
Ratliff, a senior researcher at the
Hoover Institution, in "Latin American Studies: Up from Radicalism?"
(Academic Questions, Winter 198990). As for the Latin American
Studies Association, Ratliff quotes a
"social democratic colleague" who
concludes that "'the best thing
about LASA lately is its increasing
irrelevance outside of itself.'"

Thanks to Hollywood actor Emilio
Estevez, Bolivian presidentJaime
Paz Zamora now has his own official Lear jet. In June 1990 Estevez
and four others visited Bolivia to
scout a future film site. When Bolivian authorities discovered traces of
cocaine in Estevez's rented Lear
jet, they arrested the actor and his
companions, confiscated the plane,
and, after a pompous ceremony,
presented it to Paz Zamora. Critics
in the Bolivian congress charged
the US with hypocrisy when, in the
midst of the US-promoted war on
drugs, Ambassador Robert S. Gelbard pressured Bolivian authorities
to release Estevez and the others.
The plane, however, remains in
Bolivian possession.

Counting the Minutes .. .
Since the '80s there has been dissatisfaction with the leadership of
the Inter-American Foundation.
Promising changes, however, are
afoot. President Deborah Szekely
has resigned, effective September
30, 1990. Her interim replacement
will be Steve Vetter, currently IAF
vice president for Programs. Frank
Yturria, a Texas rancher and a
major financial backer of the Republican Party, was named IAF's
chairman of the board in July. Reflecting widespread sentiment, one
observer stated that "anticipation
of Szekely's departure is intense."

Edited by Mark B. Rosenberg
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Hugo's Wrath
The effects of Hurricane Hugo's
damage are still being felt throughout the Caribbean. In May 1990
the US International Trade Commission reported that Hugo was
the primary reason for the disastrous decline in rum exports
from the US Virgin Islands, which
dipped from 7.9 million proof
liters in 1988 to about 500,000
proof liters in 1989.

Try Er6tica
In February 1990 Epic Records
released Eroticaby harpist Roberto
Perera, a native of Uruguay who
has been in the US for almost two
decades. The musician's instrument is the Paraguayan harp, a
pedal-less folk instrument carved
from spruce and either mahogany
or cedar. Of his music, one reviewer stated "it is not new age. Nor is it
jazz or pop or anything else known
to those who categorize music"
(Greg Baker, "Harp of Gold," New

Times, April 4-10, 1990, p. 42).

Watch Out
Fyffes, an Anglo-Irish company
based in the UK, has successfully
broken a contract held by Chiquita
International Brands with a local
banana producer in Honduras.
The conflict between the two
banana exporters erupted in
March 1990 and was resolved in
June through an out-of-court settlement. The agreement has recast
the terms of business reference.
Fyffes now pays for bananas in dollars-a move that has forced Chiquita to do the same-and has
offered a 50% price increase to
Honduran producers. Fyffes's actions are a harbinger of new
producer-exporter relations, as
other European firms seek to meet
the continent's growing demand
for tropical fruit.

E

Fine Print

Greener Pastures

Artistic Touch

On July 23, 1990, the US government announced that 67 products
(e.g., plywood, laminated cotton
products, toys, fruits and vegetables, flatware, cut flowers, ethanol,
and soybean oil) from Colombia,
Ecuador, Peru, and Bolivia are
eligible for duty-free entry into the
US under a special review of the
Generalized System of Preferences.
It now seems, however, that the
measures designed to stimulate
these Andean economies may be
more beneficial to Pacific-rim
countries such as Malaysia, Thailand, and the Philippines. Of the
Andean economies, Peru's-the
biggest and most diversified-may
be the greatest beneficiary.

Once he covered death squads in
El Salvador and cocaine trafficking
in Colombia. Now Guy Gugliotta, a
former Miami Heraldcorrespondent currently with the Washington
Post, is writing about farming in the
US. His Post story, "Agencies' Spat
Blocks Plan for Reducing Coca
Crops" (June 27, 1990, p. 17), exposes a nasty "spat" between the
Departments of Agriculture and
State over the latter's support for
crop diversification. The story highlights the contradictions of US efforts to convince Latin American
countries to commit to alternative
crop development, particularly if
the alternative will compete with
US exports. In this case, US
programs to facilitate Bolivia's efforts to expand soya cultivation
clash with efforts to boost US exports of soya to other markets.

Latin American Art is a new Arizonabased magazine published and
edited by Michael Marcellino. Each
issue is packed with vibrant multicolored advertisements and reproductions of classic traditional and
modern Latin American artwork.
The spring 1990 issue carries a richly illustrated article on American
painter Stuart Davis's trip to
Havana in the early 1920s. Another
article, written by Andeanologist
James Reid, describes the evolution
and importance of Peruvian figurative textiles.

Polling the Polls
The spring 1990 issue of InteramericanPublic OpinionReport
provides a thoughtful set of
analyses on recent public opinion
efforts in Latin America. Published
by the Latin American Studies Program at California State University
(Los Angeles), the newsletter examines recent polling difficulties in
Nicaragua and Peru. For instance,
one article suggests that Alberto
Fujimori's startling ascendency
during Peru's primary election campaign was generally predicted by
Apoyo, the same polling firm that
had been employed by novelist and
candidate Mario Vargas Llosa.
Apoyo predicted the new president's extent of support at about
21%. He actually received 29% and
then soundly whipped the hapless
writer in the June run-off.

The Latest Word
"Unauthorized Migration: An
Economic Development Response"
(July 1990) is one of the most useful policy-oriented studies on international migration produced in
years. The study was developed by
the Commission for the Study of International Migration and Cooperative Economic Development, a
bipartisan commission led by
former US ambassador Diego
Asencio. It does not mince words:
for instance, "US immigration
policy has long been ambivalent
and often incoherent," and "The
issue for many countries is stark:
they either export goods and services to create jobs at home or they
export people."

On the Move
Francisco Rojas Aravena, one of
Central America's leading social
scientists, returned to live in his
native Chile after ten years in San
Jose, Costa Rica. A Hemisphere
board member, Rojas will work
with the FacultadLatinoamericanade
Ciencias Sociales, in Santiago.
Guido Pennano, economist, publisher, and Hemisphereboard member, has been appointed minister
of industry and commerce in Peru.
He will also have responsibility for
economic integration, tourism
development, and the new government's privatization program.
Jaime Lavados has become the first
democratically elected rector of
the Universidadde Chile in 17 years.
During that period the institution's
leadership had been named directly by General Augusto Pinochet.
Lavados, a physician, is an internationally recognized specialist on
Latin American higher education.
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Insular Revolution
by Irving Louis Horowitz

have said to a group of
astonished diplomats in
Havana: "If these
changes go on in the
reported
to be
USSR,was
they
will soon
describing us as those madmen in
the Albania of the Caribbean."
Whether this is a piece of apocrypha or an actual interview, the
fact is Albania and Cuba remain,
albeit for quite different reasons,
holdouts in the revolutions that
have swept communist regimes
from power in Eastern Europe, and
have roiled the political process
within the USSR. To be sure, and
as hard as it may be to believe,
there has been more movement
toward reform in Albania in 1990
than in Cuba. Why has Cuba been
resistant to change, and what
changes can be expected?

Castro

Cuba: Stasis and Change
The first reason for Cuba's holdout
is its inherited version of Latin
American militarism. Cuba is
neither socialist nor Third World
in the classical sense. Caudillismo
is more prevalent in Cuba than in

Irving Louis Horowitz, Hannah
Arendt distinguishedprofessorof
sociology and political science at
Rutgers University, is the editor of
Cuban Communism (7th ed.;
Transaction, 1989).
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most Latin American societies;
indeed, the caudillo image is
probably truer for Cuba now than
in the pre-Castro epoch. Cuba's
armed forces have occupied a mostfavored status from the outset of
the Castro regime some 31 years
ago. This status has been overlooked, or better muted, because
the extreme left was able to define
the situation, insisting upon casual
designations of Cuba as socialist or
communist.
There was a false presumption
that radical regimes tend to undercut long-standing Latin American
traditions of the military figure on
horseback. But the military man in
a tank is much the same thing. The
key is neither the horse nor the
tank-but the militarized character
of the society. In fact, the military
is the only social force that has
been institutionalized in contemporary Cuba. As a result it might
well be the unique element in the
Cuban cockpit that would fight to
support rather than overthrow
Castro in a showdown struggle.
A second reason is demographic
displacement, that is, the drainage
of revolutionary sentiment through
the emigration of malcontents and
innovators to other shores-from
Miami to Paris. Consequently the
most discontented and determined
ended up in exile and not in
armed insurrection against the
regime. Castro learned well the lessons of sociology: that permitting
emigration is the functional

equivalent of tranquilizing a discontented people.
A third reason for Cuba's stasis is its geographic isolation. A
unique characteristic of many island societies is their remoteness.
Since external ideas and influences
filter into Cuba only with difficulty,
information, even from the USSR,
can be shut out at the whim of the
leader. Moreover, insularity means
that local issues become global in
perceived importance. Irritations
that occur in nations that share
common borders and uncommon
social systems have not affected
Castro's Cuba, at least not as
serious threats to regime stability.
A fourth reason is the "originalleader" syndrome. As shown by the
case of Francisco Franco in Spain,
the political structure of a regime
may persist long after the utility of
a regime has vanished, in part because of the sheer physical survival
of a charismatic original leader.
Such a leader often becomes exempt from criticism and immune
from removal. As such, the Castro
regime is a prime example of the
original-leader syndrome.
These considerations should not
lead, however, to the politics of assassination. For one thing, the first
attempt at assassination failed
miserably. But more important, we
have no assurance that the liquidation of Castro will bring about the
end of the dictatorial regime.
Despite lacking a popular base,
Rail, as the younger brother,

E

could inherit all sorts of good will,
and protract the period of dictatorship instead of bringing down the
regime. Desperation politics is
neither desirable nor necessary at
this time.

Castro's Neo-Stalinism
The character of neo-Stalinism as
an independent element in communist survival cannot be overlooked. One must emphasize the
term "neo," in that the genocidal
potential of the Castro regime was
rarely impressed on the Cuban
citizenry. Neo-Stalinist elements in
Cuba include lawlessness of the system, lack of accountability (both to
its own people and to outside
powers), and secrecy in decisionmaking.
Neo-Stalinism has all of the elements of repression without the
necessity for physical dismemberment. Symbolic terror, and the
everyday social force of the Comitis
para la Defensa de la Revolucion, are
adequate to the task. Such neoStalinist cadres make it more likely
that a bitter civil struggle as in
Romania, rather than the benign
outcome as in the rest of Eastern
Europe, is the scenario to anticipate.
Dynastic communism as such
enters the Cuban equation. While
it shares many of the properties of
neo-Stalinism, the familial feature
of the Castro regime has long been
recognized as an element unto itself. Descriptions of fascist Italy
have called this pattern "clientelism." In the absence of formal
structures that tend to make public
actions predictable, the state is displaced by the person as the dominant force in public actions.
Private gift-giving and factional in-

trigue become the dominant mode
of operation. Fidel, Rail, and
Vilma become Cuban equivalents
to Richard, Henry, and Elizabethmonarchs who sit unsteadily on
their thrones.
As Douglas W. Payne points
out, capriciousness plays a role:
"Castro's career has been marked
by numerous sharp turns in both
domestic and foreign policy. The
possibility cannot be excluded that
he might suddenly declare himself
a champion of perestroikaand
swear, in typically egotistical fashion, his perestroikais the best. He
would then demand immediate
concessions from the United
States, including an end to economic embargo, and would have
the full support of Moscow" (Radio
FreeEurope-RadioLiberty, January 12,
1990, p. 9). This scenario is possible but not inevitable.

Cuba at the Breaking Point
What then pushes the Cuban political process to the breaking point,
but prevents it from going to
pieces entirely? Primarily the foreign, overseas conditions in which
Cuba finds itself: total dependence
upon Soviet economic support,
declining interest on the part of
former Eastern European allies like
Czechoslovakia, the willingness of
the US to let Castro continue to
twist in the wind, and a near breakdown in Cuba's ability to meet its
own basic trade and sales obligations, even at the bartering levels.
There is an increasing urgency,
even stridency, in forcing the US to
say "what if..." with respect to a
post-Castro Cuba. But thus far, this
tendency to announce scenarios in
advance of actions has been resisted, and properly so given the

S

past exaggerations and expectations in policy responses.
The critical factor is the continuing support by the USSR for the
Castro regime, albeit in a much
lower ideological key. Despite the
widely heralded hostility between
Castro's Procesode Rectificacion and
Gorbachev's perestroika,prospects
for an open rupture are slim. The
two nations are in a condition best
described as a marriage of convenience, a state of shared needs
rather than private affections.
The USSR has so many problems within a European context,
that it will not threaten its stable
relations with Cuba unless absolutely forced to do so. Similarly, on the
Cuban side, with the enormous
shrinkage in aid and trade with
Eastern Europe, Cuban dependency on Soviet aid is higher than
ever. And with debt repayment at a
standstill, neither side is prepared
to cancel the debt nor put an end
to continuing supports-especially
with outstanding debt reaching
$17 billion in 1988. To be sure,
Castro will seek to replace the decline in trade with Eastern Europe
by appeals for hemispheric solidarity. But even if he finds ideological support in this action, the sad
state of so many Latin American
economies will restrict his acute

sense of functional dependence
upon the USSR.
Continuing aid and trade, then,
is the best way for the USSR to
move Castro from his current

fanatic antiprivate-sector position.
This is to be done by compelling
Cuba to deal with autonomous
Soviet factories rather than with a
centralized agency as in the past.
Such bilateralism will have the effect of imposing economic rational-

ity on Cuba by forcing a balanced
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trade and decreasing subsidies.
The Cuban edge will be in the
prospects for getting world market
prices for its sugar exports, of
which 80% go to the USSR at
present. In any event, enterprise to
enterprise arrangements are inherently more balanced than small
nation to giant nation bilateralism.
In this setting, the Cuban
military system remains entirely a
creature of Soviet hardware and
logistics. It is impossible for a complete shutdown in hardware aid to
lead to anything other than a complete rupture. Indeed, in 1990
Cuba is completing a large missile
battery project on the outskirts of
Havana that will deploy Sovietmade SA-2 Guideline missiles. US
satellite photos indicate these missiles are already in the early stages
of deployment. The missile can
strike aircraft flying at up to 50,000
feet. And given Castro's conviction
that an invasion from the US must
come sooner or later, he is in no
position to do without Soviet
hardware-even if it be of a late
1950s vintage. A bargaining chip
for Castro, however, is that Cuba is
now the USSR's only bastion in the
Western world.
Still, there are dangers in the
Cuban situation. In Spain a monarchist tradition provided a key element in the transition to Spanish
democracy in the 1970s. Such an
element does not exist in Cuba. It
is possible, though, that the exile
community may function in such a
restorationist capacity, at least to
cushion the shock of transition
during the early stages of a return
to democratic norms and freemarket relations. Both a welfareoriented left and a free-market
right will have to be recreated in
Cuba as a means to insure the durability and stability of a democratic
transition.
That we are talking in admittedly speculative terms indicates that
some form of end to the Cuban dictatorship is near at hand; if not in
1990, then it assuredly will occur in
this decade, probably in the early
years. Castro is down to the bare
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bones of the family. His administrative infrastructure is demoralized,
the earlier passion among the
military cadres for international
adventure has been sapped by battles in Africa and trials in Cuba,
and the energy of the best and the
brightest has long ago migrated
abroad.

A Post-Castro Cuba
There is broad consensus on how a
viable economy can emerge from
the rubble of a post-Castro Cuba: a
renewed emphasis on tourism; the
opening of the agrarian sector to
private initiative and distribution;
and the sort of crop diversification
long promised but never delivered
by the Castro regime. There is substantially less agreement, however,
on the sources of Cuban political
renewal. Cuban society has been so
dismantled that few independent
forces can be identified, much less
predicted, to play important roles.
The military is so constrained by
Soviet patterns of professionalism
that it can hardly be counted on
for probing, much less bringing
forth, democratic options. The
Catholic Church is not in the position to exercise supreme authority
as it is in, say, Poland or even in
Nicaragua. Unlike Eastern Europe,
it might well turn out that the most
serious problems of reconstruction
in Cuba will be political rather
than economic.

What we have is best described
as a continuing political tragedy,
slightly lessened by an end to the
tyranny in sight. Any rejoicing
should be muted in the face of the
calamitous outcome of this revolution, one begun in high expectations and concluding with the near
total paralysis of a major Caribbean
nation. The great length of time
under which Cuban people have
suffered tyranny will make the task
of democracy harder and the
potential for disillusionment
greater. Fortunately the quality of
Cuba's people, and the good will
they have engendered by their
diligence and patience everywhere
from Miami to Caracas, should
serve to cut down the retooling
time of the society in its effort to
return to the family of democratic
nations. Still, we would be well advised to think carefully on the
heavy price paid by blind passions
and a revanchist spirit in past efforts to improve the lot of the
Cuban people and system. In so
doing, we must start by curbing our
own euphoria while passing along
our current wisdom, without laundering our past follies, to the next
generation.
The Cuban people deserve
nothing less from academic intellectuals and federal policymakers
than a proper display of candor.
Cerebral types have made terrible
mistakes in the past-starting with
empirical miscalculations on the nature of regimes at their outset, and
ending with renewed appeals for
reconciliation in the dictators' final
years. For these reasons we must
greet the coming democratization
of Cuba with joy in our hearts,
tempered by modesty in our
analysis and recommendations. To
do otherwise is to run the serious
risk of repeating errors rather than
locating truths of this quite special
moment in history. .

Editor's Note: Adapted from Freedom
at Issue (July/August 1990), a publication ofFreedom House, Inc.
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Making Do, Making Deals
by Mimi Whitefield

nouncements tout the
virtues of rectificacion, a
quiet undertow of illegal trade and personal
profit tugs at the everyday lives of Cubans. Though it
stands in defiance of the state's ideology and policy, almost all Cubans
dabble in the island's black market.
Luis and Clara, fictitious names
for a Havana couple in their 40s,
work in modest restaurant jobs.
Together they earn a mere $520 a
month at the official exchange
rate. Since 1985, however, the couple has moved into a much more
spacious apartment, bought a
Polish Fiat, and purchased a motorcycle. Luis and Clara owe little of
their good fortune to frugality.
They are members of a shadow capitalist class that trades with the help
of foreign partners for hefty profits.
As Luis explains, "Say a pair of
jeans costs $15. We don't sell them
for 5 pesos to $1. We sell them for
150 pesos, with 10% going to the
partner." As a result the couple has
a joint account with a cousin at a
Miami bank, a Spanish partner
who helps with their financial transactions, and another foreign partner who appraises the gold jewelry
they handle as a sideline.
The widespread availability of
consumer goods, fashionable footgear, and other items is striking in
comparison with the barren state
stores where only Cuban currency
is accepted and goods are rationed.
The reason is that Cubans who
manage to obtain dollars or have
large quantities of pesos can buy
goods at hugely inflated prices.

Mimi Whitefield is a Latin America
correspondentfor the Miami Herald.
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AJapanese television, for example,
that normally sells for $400 might
sell for $4,000 on the black market.

Points of Entry
How are the foreign goods and currency obtained? Among the myriad
channels is the Russian connection. Soviet technicians and other
workers with access to foreign currency and to special stores for
diplomats and tourists are notorious for reselling goods for a small
profit. On the black market, said
one Havana resident, the going
price for a ruble certificate that allows the purchase of a dollar's
worth of goods in diplomatic stores
is 3 pesos, while a dollar certificate
is worth 7 pesos.
Relatives visiting from the US or
Spain are another source of currency and goods, particularly clothing
and small appliances. So are
Cubans who work for, or have contact with, foreign diplomatic missions, as well as store clerks who
simply help themselves when shipments arrive. Of course, Cubans
sometimes befriend foreigners solely to enlist them for purchases in
dollar stores. On balance, most of
the products seem to come from
the diplomatic and tourist stores.
According to US economist
Andrew Zimbalist, the black market probably accounts for 10-15%
of the Cuban economy.
Havana is filled with young men
with no apparent occupation who
do odd jobs and dabble in the
black market, including selling
quantities of rationed staples, like
butter, at substantial markups.
Twenty-four-year-old Pablo, a
former technical drafting teacher
who has not worked in three years
because he turned down a transfer

to a school outside Havana, sells
small items obtained through connections in the dollar stores. "I'm
very careful. I stay away from major
items and I manage to stay out of
trouble," he said.
Ironically, even as the Cuban
government campaigns for "revolutionary purity," underground buying and selling is abetted by the
official program of tourism development to obtain much-needed
foreign currency. In August, however, the provincial court in Ciego
de Avila sentenced 19 people in
connection with a black-market
scheme at the dollar store in the
Mor6n Hotel. The scheme included illegal purchases by Cubans
and foreigners alike in cooperation
with the store administrator and
several other employees..When arrested, the group had $4,000 in
cash, as well as illegally purchased
clothing, electronic goods, and appliances. The store administrator
received the longest sentence: four
years.
Yet black-market operations, like
those of Clara and Luis, will not be
easy to eradicate. As Clara asserted,
"We're not harming anybody. We
don't steal. In fact, we supply
people with things they wouldn't
be able to buy otherwise. This
society needs people like us because the state doesn't know how
to run a business."
Luis believes free-market
reforms will come to Cuba eventually. "They're coming, no doubt
about that. But it'll be a few years,"
he said. "Meanwhile we're doing
well for ourselves. The secret is, if
you're smart you can do well in
business, but you always have to
keep a regular job and have a good
record. I tell you we perform
needed services in this country." .

New Voices
by Anne-Marie O'Connor

Cuban singers and artists is startling the sensibilities of hardline
Communist officials
with jibes at revolutionary icons and calls for reform.
Among them is pop singer Carlos
Varela, whose biggest hit is banned
on Radio Habana,even though he
is a self-professed supporter of the
Cuban revolution and an enemy of
Yankee imperialism. Many already
call the 27-year-old performer the
spokesman of his generation.
In November 1988 the manager
of the Teatro 2 3y 12 in Havana
decided Varela's musical message
exceeded the bounds of acceptable
socialist self-criticism. During a
break, he told Varela the rest of
the show was cancelled. Word of
the order spread quickly through
the crowd, murmers of protest
turned to shouts, and fist-fights
broke out. By the end of the melee,
a throng of Varela's fans-fervently
loyal young women, for the most
part-had been carted off to the
police station. Varela says the incident spotlighted the type of narrowminded thinking many members
of his generation would like to see
eradicated in Cuba. "They are culture police," Varela said. "And they
are all infected with the suspicion
syndrome. But fortunately the
truth is greater than they."

Generation Gap
Varela is by far the mildest of
Cuba's young artistic enfants ter-

Anne-Marie O'Connoris a Latin
America and Caribbeancorrespondent
for Cox Newspapers.

ribles. In "Guillermo Tell" he
employs a subtle allegory to warn
greying revolutionaries that a new
generation is coming of age in
Cuba, where 60% of the population was born after the 1959 revolution. "William Tell didn't understand
his son who one day got sick of having
the apple on his head ... it was a
shock when the young one said 'Nowfor
the father the apple on his head/William Tell your son has grown/he wants
to shoot the arrow ... and with your
own crossbow.'"

Varela believes there is a generation gap in Cuba, and that younger
Cubans want more freedom of expression and movement. He speaks
of the need to reform-rather than
fundamentally change-Cuban
socialism. 'This generation is
moving at a much faster pace. It is
more critical, more dissatisfied," he
said. "It's a spirit of rebellion
against conformity, intransigence,
poor workmanship," Varela said.
"You talk to an older Cuban man

and he'll say 'remember when we
were paid wages too low to live on,
when we had no refrigerator or
running water.' But we weren't
even born then."
As the IV Congreso del Partidoapproaches, the state is officially encouraging people "within the
revolution" to criticize anything
but the most basic issues-oneparty rule and the centralized
socialist economy. It is cracking
down on people, like political dissidents, viewed as being "against the
revolution."
Some young artists have been
accused of taking their aesthetic critiques too far. According to artists
and diplomats, in a "guerrilla
theater" performance piece that
began popping up in late 1989, a
youth would sit on a toilet reading
the official Communist Party organ, Granma,while a tape of Fidel
Castro droned in the background,
sometimes even in public places
like parks. The group responsible
was Arte Calle,whose members were
systematically detained for questioning. The group has since dissolved.
Attempts to absorb such independent art movements into the
party youth framework have sometimes backfired. For example, in
May 1990 the party organized a
sculpture show at the Centro de Artes
Visuales as part of a national campaign to educate Cuba's youth
about their "historic debt" to the
revolution. At the now notorious
avant-garde show, one young artist
stacked tiers of television sets with
images of the main checkpoint of
the Berlin Wall on their screens.
The last screen held a vast, empty
view of the ocean, something
guests interpreted as a symbol of
Cuba's own aquatic iron curtain,
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diplomats and artists said. Another
artist exhibited something even
less subtle: a copy of Granma that
he had defecated on.
People who rushed to the Centro
de Artes Visuales the day after the
opening found it closed. The official who oversaw it was moved to a
noncultural post and several others
were demoted. 'That exhibit was
considered much too much," a
Latin American diplomat said.
"The government realized that the
young artists were very aggressive
in the use of symbols-Fidel, Che,
Granma-thatare considered
sacred."

Tough Times
Some diplomats say such elements
of Cuba's youth culture point to
fundamental differences in generational attitudes. They say that,
frustrated by restrictions on personal freedoms and by consumer
shortages, the most open critics of

the revolution are emerging from
the generation raised by it. "There
is a very impressive generation gap
here," said a European diplomat
from a country with a commercial
and cultural exchange with Cuba.
"Many people born after the revolution feel like, 'Okay, we have free
health care, we have free education, but why should that be the
end-all? We want more, is that a
sin?"' He adds, '"There is a core
group who would follow Fidel to
the end. But many of the young
are bored with the same old
speeches that haven't changed in
30 years."
Party officials say there is no
generational rift, but they admit a
top priority is educating the 60%
of Cubans born after the revolution. "There are many who were
born after the revolution and
never knew Cuba as it was before,"
said 34-year-old Roberto Robaina,
an adjunct member of the Politburo
and the
new
of aa new~
orchestrator of
the orchestrator
buro and
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series of pop concerts, parties, and
educational events designed to
demonstrate the relevance of the
party to young people's lives. "They
do not know what conquests health
care and education were, and they
take them for granted. That is our
most complex problem," he said.
Moreover, young Cubans are
coming of age amidst profound
changes in Cuba's economy. The
gradual collapse of the subsidized
communist bloc trade is exacerbating scarcities in everything from
razor blades to insecticide. But
under a strange and highly unpopular system of "tourist apartheid," the rarest luxury goods are
openly available at tourist stores
closed to ordinary Cubans.

Tropical Fallout
The resulting political fallout has
made a hit of Carlos Varela's sizzling salsa-Latin-jazz dance tune

called "Tropicollage," which
employees of Radio Habanasay
they have been told not to air. Its
title was inspired by Tropicola, a
Cuban version of Coca-Cola, but
the lyrics are no endorsement:
"If you go to the hotels and you are not
a foreigner, they treatyou differently.
That's what's going on here, and I
want to change it, and whoever denies
it isfull of Tropicollage."
Gillian Gunn, of the Cuba
Project of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, said
that given the outlook of increasing scarcity, the Communist leadership may decide it is politically
expedient to expand young people's freedoms. "I suspect that what
some people in the leadership are
arguing is 'Look, we don't have the
foreign exchange to satisfy their
hunger for consumer goods, but
freedom of expression doesn't cost
foreign exhange," Gunn said. "And
if what they're asking for is to be
able to sing certain songs and be
part of a global youth culture that
does not explicitly threaten the revolution, a strategic decision may be
made that that's the best way to ,
defuse discontent." .

Reading the Music
by Ramon A. Mestre

the Jews as the "People of
the Book." For Islam the
Jews' unique devotion to
the Torah set them apart
from other peoples of the
ancient world.
Cubans are "people of the
rhythms." As much as some other
integral parts of Cuban national
identity-the work ofJose Marti or
the common suffering of 30 tragic
years of revolution-the island's
popular music is its Torah.

The July 1990 defection of
Arturo Sandoval, one of the
world's best trumpet players, discredits the Cuban government's
claims about Cuban identity and
culture. Havana's ideologues assert
that Cuban identity can only be
conceived within the "revolution."
That is an insidious way of saying
that only revolutionaries are "true
Cubans."
Allusions to music are notably
absent from Fidel Castro's
speeches. Little is known about his
musical tastes. I have the impression that he cannot tell a Sandoval
trumpet solo from a Galician bagpipe chorus. Music does not matter
to "El ComandanteenJefe," who
takes a manic interest in just about
everything else: modern medicine,
ancient history, bread-making, and
hydroponic agriculture.
Thus, the Procesode Rectificaci6n,
Castro's regressive counterreformation, is partly based on a denial of
reality. Rectificaciondoes not constitute a coherent set of policies. It
is the improvised strategy of a paranoid ruler who seeks to preserve

Ram6n A. Mestre is a member of the
editorialboard of the Miami Herald.

his absolute hold on power. It is
also the stratagem of a tone deaf
despot, for whom traditions such as
the son-that most Cuban of all
musical forms-have no place.

Rhythm of Renewal
Sandoval's defection augurs the
final dissolution of the Cuban
regime. A brilliant musician who
shelters Cuba's soul within his
trumpet's remarkable voice, Sandoval did not flee Cuba in search
of lucrative record contracts. He
will certainly earn more money in
the West, though in Cuba he enjoyed material comforts comparable to those of most
distinguished American jazz artists.
Sandoval toured abroad and
played with excellent musicians.
But he toured in the perpetual
state of fear that afflicts most
Cubans. To borrow from Yeats's
"Second Coming," Arturo Sandoval
has fled an island where "the center cannot hold ... things fall apart
... the blood-dimmed tide is
loosed ... the worst are full of passionate intensity."
Sandoval was not an invention
of the "passionate intensity" of
Cuba's groveling commissars.
Before taking up jazz and classical
music, Sandoval learned to play the
son. By turning to the son and other
Cuban rhythms, he honored his
predecessors, illustrious Cuban
trumpeters like Luis Escalante,
Chappottin, Jorge Varona, Alejandro "El Negro" Vivar, and "Chocolate" Armenteros.
His genius first moved me in
1978 when a friend called my attention to Sandoval's playing on the
Havana to New York Jam record.
Technically Sandoval was the most
dazzling trumpeter I had ever

heard. His registers were so high
that he managed to make his horn
sound like a novel instrument.
Years later I was even more stirred
by Sandoval's forays into traditional Cuban music. By then his technical virtuosity had been tempered
and his improvisations were convincing and deeply felt. Sandoval
sounded like a mature man who
had rediscovered the strengths of
his musical origins.
Most Cubans define themselves
by what they are not. They are, for
instance, "anti-Castroites," "antiimperialists," or "nonpolitical,"
though the dislocations and the
ordeals of the last three decades
have deepened the sense of identity and the values of numerous
Cubans. Sandoval's best work embodies some of those values. The
music he plays in exile will continue to embody them.
His decision to seek political
asylum in the US will inspirit the
people of Cuba as much as Cuban
air force general Rafael del Pino's
spectacular flight to Key West in
1987. I wonder what the reaction
of millions of Americans would
have been if Frank Sinatra had
defected to the USSR at the height
of the Vietnam War.
Sandoval does not have any secrets to share with CIA debriefers.
They are not interested in the techniques of a virtuoso trumpet player. But more than any analyst,
Sandoval knows the secrets of a
Cuba that will endure long after
Fidel Castro disappears. Unlike the
limited "data" some defectors spirit
away when they flee, the riches Sandoval brings with him replenish
themselves each time he blows on
his incredible trumpet. It is the
only instrument that evokes the
horns ofJericho. .
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Time for Change in Cuba
by Claiborne Pell

ecent events in Cuba
have caused me to reevaluate my position on
United States policy
toward that country. For
30 years I have advocated
normalization of relations between
Cuba and the United States, and
the lifting of economic sanctions
against Cuba. In that period I hav
made three trips to Cuba, the mo
recent in November 1988. At the
time of that trip some very positiv
things were happening in Cuba,
including greater freedom for the
small human rights groups that
had formed, improved prison cor
ditions, and the release of a number of political prisoners.
During my last meeting with
President Castro, I handed him a
list of suggestions for a series of
mutually beneficial steps that the
United States and Cuba could tak
to prepare the way for an eventua
normalization of relations. Follow
ing my visit the Cuban governmer
released a number of political priS
oners, including most of those
referred to as "historic plantados,"
some of whom had been in prison
for up to 25 years. I was grateful
that these prisoners were released
and some of their families have ex
pressed gratitude to me for my efforts, But aside from that there ha
been no sign that President Castro
really wants an improved relationship with the United States.
I recognize that the Cubans, an
President Castro in particular, hay
reasons to be cautious about the
United States-past US-sponsored
attempts at assassination and inva-

Claiborn Pell (D-Rl) chairs the Senate

Committee on ForeignRelations.
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sion head the list. Perhaps it is
Castro's assessment that the Bush
administration is not ready to improve relations with Cuba at this
time. But in the 18 months since
my trip I have not seen any evidence of a desire by Cuba to even
explore steps toward an improvement of relations.

Eastern Europe is to dig in his
heels.
In refusing to follow Gorbachev's lead on perestroika and glasnost, it seems that Castro does not
care if Cuba becomes the Albania
or the North Korea of the Caribbean. Even Albania, to my amazement, seems to be resPonding to
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Baja's Tourism Boom
by Lawrence A. Herzog

in December 1988, President Carlos Salinas de
Gortari announced-to
the dismay of many
Mexicans-that his administration would "restructure"
foreign investment laws to bring in
badly needed outside capital.
Among the changes immediately
enacted was the relaxation of laws
that permitted a maximum of 49%
foreign ownership of business enterprises in Mexico; the laws now
permit 100% foreign ownership in
certain kinds of economic activity.
In addition the revised laws double
the leasing period for foreign possession of property, through the socalled fideicomiso (trust), from 30 to
60 years.
The Salinas government was
prepared to actively court US investment in some sectors of the
economy. For example, tourism
represented a potentially much
greater source of national revenue
than previous administrations had
tapped; but new infrastructure

Lawrence A. Herzog, associateprofessor
of Mexican-American studies at San
Diego State University, is the authorof
Where North Meets South (University of Texas Press, 1990).

32

Hemisphere

.

Summer 1990

could not be built without foreign
capital. Not surprisingly, in the
spring of 1989 Minister of Tourism
Carlos Hank Gonzalez embarked
on a whirlwind campaign to attract
North American investors. One US
magazine asked: "What might rescue Mexico, at least from the stigma of its incessantly predicted
collapse? Not crude oil, but tanning oil. Tourists" (Harper's,July

1989, p. 4 3 ).

The US Growth Machine
Less-developed nations such as
Mexico have become dynamic actors in the global economy. They
are the debtors in a transnational
banking system in which low and
middle-income countries owe nearly a trillion dollars; Latin America
alone must somehow repay an
estimated $400 billion. Yet debt
servicing is strangled by trade
policies that favor the world's
dominant countries, by the continued flight of capital from south
to north, and by the increasing economic leverage of transnational
banks and corporations. Evidence
suggests that in Mexico and other
Third World nations certain state
and economic interests are willing
to accommodate the inflow of global capital because they stand to
benefit.

Mexico's century-old apprehensions about economic dependence
on the US have yielded to a state of
national uneasiness, especially as
negotiations proceed for a freetrade agreement and as policymakers consider the formation of a
Mexico-US common market. Still,
the loosening of Mexico's constitutional barriers against foreign
control of the economy raises questions about the national impact of
development fueled by investment
from abroad. Throughout the
underdeveloped world, disastrous
economic and ecological results of
such development patterns have
been well documented. Perhaps
most serious of all is the way massive investment can damage the
cultural fabric of regions by unraveling the web of unique physical
elements-houses, neighborhoods,
towns, and natural environmentthat are woven into the everyday
lives of local people.
Mexico's vulnerability to US investors is most blatantly revealed
along the international border
they share. Nonetheless, northern
Mexico and the southwestern US
have one element in common:
growth. Northern Mexico has
displayed one of that nation's
fastest rates of population expansion over the last three decades,
due mainly to flows of internal

I

migration. The southwestern US
claims a similar distinction north of
the border. Fueling the enormous
population expansion on both
sides is large-scale economic
transformation-in industry, technology, trade, services, and
tourism. At the heart of this transformation is the so-called US
"growth machine," an amalgam of
development-oriented enterprises.
These include not only the commonly cited maquiladorasand
tourist sector. They also include
land investors, real estate entrepreneurs, developers, banks, construction companies, architecture
firms, and related businesses.
Despite the evolution of transnat;inal

flnu

danital

abrupt in Baja California, where
hundreds of miles of beach-front
property are finally being discovered by investors from the
north. Baja California is a 55,000
square-mile peninsula dominated
by desert and mountain wilderness.
Its vast coastline, east and west, is
mostly undeveloped and exquisite.
While its northern flanks, lying at
the foot of southern California, are
heavily urbanized, the remainder

cmnr'

telling example of how Mexico's
search for a quick economic fix
may be culturally disruptive in the
long run.
This collision between economy
and culture has been particularly

of the peninsula is wildly pristine,
a vast frontier comparable in magnitude to other great wilderness
areas such as Brazil's upper
Amazon Basin and Australia's
outback.
Proximity to the postindustrial
megalopolis of southern California
makes Baja California highly vulnerable to the marketing interests
of the US growth machine. Several
decades ago, writers glorified Baja
California's isolation in books like
Joseph Wood Krutch's The Forgotten

Peninsula(1961). It was inevitable,
however, that a land so rich in
beauty and so close to the exploding markets of southern California
would be brought within reach of
land developers.
Already there is evidence that
the peninsula is losing its Mexican
cultural flavor, as North American
influence migrates south. More
than 25 million US tourists visit the
peninsula each year. Some 42,500
North Americans reside on the
peninsula, and in one stretch of
65 miles along the coast between
Tijuana and Ensenada, 25,000
North Americans occupy exclusive
housing subdivisions in an enormous wedge of prime beach-front
land. Only Guadalajara, long a
retirement destination for US citizens, has more North Americans.
These statistics convey only part
of the extent to which the peninsula is being swept into North
America's cultural and economic
web. For instance, several commercial airlines are opening direct service routes into Baja California.
Direct flights connect Baja with
San Diego, Los Angeles, Dallas,
Denver, Vancouver, and Toronto,
and the list keeps growing. Furthermore, beaches from San Felipe to
Loreto and Cabo San Lucas, which
were once isolated, are now overrun by time-share condominium
developments, all-terrain vehicles,
and recreational vehicle parks.
To Californians looking south,
Baja California no longer seems distant, isolated, and empty, or far
from the beaten path. Even Hollywood considers southern Baja within reach. In a recent movie The
Boost (1989), members of the Los
Angeles jet set flew their private
airplane to Cabo San Lucas on the
southern cape of Baja (some 1,000
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Baja's Tourism Boom
by Lawrence A. Herzog

in December 1988, President Carlos Salinas de
Gortari announced-to
the dismay of many
Mexicans-that his administration would "restructure"
foreign investment laws to bring in
badly needed outside capital.
Among the changes immediately
enacted was the relaxation of laws
that permitted a maximum of 49%
foreign ownership of business enterprises in Mexico; the laws now
permit 100% foreign ownership in
certain kinds of economic activity.
In addition the revised laws double
the leasing period for foreign possession of property, through the socalled fideicomiso (trust), from 30 to
60 years.
The Salinas government was
prepared to actively court US investment in some sectors of the
economy. For example, tourism
represented a potentially much
greater source of national revenue
than previous administrations had
tapped; but new infrastructure
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could not be built without foreign
capital. Not surprisingly, in the
spring of 1989 Minister of Tourism
Carlos Hank Gonzalez embarked
on a whirlwind campaign to attract
North American investors. One US
magazine asked: "What might rescue Mexico, at least from the stigma of its incessantly predicted
collapse? Not crude oil, but tanning oil. Tourists" (Harper's,July
1989, p. 43).

Mexico's century-old apprehensions about economic dependence
on the US have yielded to a state of
national uneasiness, especially as
negotiations proceed for a freetrade agreement and as policymakers consider the formation of a
Mexico-US common market. Still

The US Growth Machine
Less-developed nations such as
Mexico have become dynamic actors in the global economy. They
are the debtors in a transnational
banking system in which low and
middle-income countries owe nearly a trillion dollars; Latin America
alone must somehow repay an
estimated $400 billion. Yet debt
servicing is strangled by trade
policies that favor the world's
dominant countries, by the continued flight of capital from south
to north, and by the increasing economic leverage of transnational
banks and corporations. Evidence
suggests that in Mexico and other
Third World nations certain state
and economic interests are willing
to accommodate the inflow of global capital because they stand to
benefit.

have one element in common:
growth. Northern Mexico has
displayed one of that nation's
fastest rates of population expansion over the last three decades,
due mainly to flows of internal

migration. The southwestern US
claims a similar distinction north of
the border. Fueling the enormous
population expansion on both
sides is large-scale economic
transformation-in industry, technology, trade, services, and
tourism. At the heart of this transformation is the so-called US
"growth machine," an amalgam of
development-oriented enterprises.
These include not only the commonly cited maquiladorasand
tourist sector. They also include
land investors, real estate entrepreneurs, developers, banks, construction companies, architecture
firms, and related businesses.
Despite the evolution of transnational flows of capital, goods,
and people, international borders
still serve, in principle, as dividing
lines between national cultures. Arguably, culture is the most sovereign of a nation's possessions; and
in the case of Mexico and similar
countries, it may be the last bastion
of local protection against First
World economic interests. It follows that the test of Mexico's cultural survival will begin in the
northern border zone, the first line
of defense against the growth
machine.

abrupt in Baja California, where
hundreds of miles of beach-front
property are finally being discovered by investors from the
north. Baja California is a 55,000
square-mile peninsula dominated
by desert and mountain wilderness.
Its vast coastline, east and west, is
mostly undeveloped and exquisite.
While its northern flanks, lying at
the foot of southern California, are
heavily urbanized, the remainder

Colliding Forces

of the peninsula is wildly pristine,
a vast frontier comparable in magnitude to other great wilderness
areas such as Brazil's upper
Amazon Basin and Australia's
outback.
Proximity to the postindustrial
megalopolis of southern California
makes Baja California highly vulnerable to the marketing interests
of the US growth machine. Several
decades ago, writers glorified Baja
California's isolation in books like
Joseph Wood Krutch's The Forgotten

The economic forces that shape
rapidly urbanizing areas of the US,
such as southern California, are
now aimed squarely at Mexico. The
development of the tourism economy along the Mexican border is a
telling example of how Mexico's
search for a quick economic fix
may be culturally disruptive in the
long run.
This collision between economy
and culture has been particularly

Peninsula (1961). It was inevitable,
however, that a land so rich in
beauty and so close to the exploding markets of southern California
would be brought within reach of
land developers.
Already there is evidence that
the peninsula is losing its Mexican
cultural flavor, as North American
influence migrates south. More
than 25 million US tourists visit the
peninsula each year. Some 42,500
North Americans reside on the
peninsula, and in one stretch of
65 miles along the coast between
Tijuana and Ensenada, 25,000
North Americans occupy exclusive
housing subdivisions in an enormous wedge of prime beach-front
land. Only Guadalajara, long a
retirement destination for US citizens, has more North Americans.
These statistics convey only part
of the extent to which the peninsula is being swept into North
America's cultural and economic
web. For instance, several commercial airlines are opening direct service routes into Baja California.
Direct flights connect Baja with
San Diego, Los Angeles, Dallas,
Denver, Vancouver, and Toronto,
and the list keeps growing. Furthermore, beaches from San Felipe to
Loreto and Cabo San Lucas, which
were once isolated, are now overrun by time-share condominium
developments, all-terrain vehicles,
and recreational vehicle parks.
To Californians looking south,
Baja California no longer seems distant, isolated, and empty, or far
from the beaten path. Even Hollywood considers southern Baja within reach. In a recent movie The
Boost (1989), members of the Los
Angeles jet set flew their private
airplane to Cabo San Lucas on the
southern cape of Baja (some 1,000

Hemisphere . Summer 1990

33

Features: Mexico

miles from Los Angeles) for dinner, presumably returning to Los
Angeles the same evening. Even
though Hollywood often distorts
distance and the nature of places,
such scripting reflects California's
changing perceptions of its southern neighbor. Mexico has moved
into Hollywood's line of vision, and
her exotic shores lie within reach
of the affluent.
A century ago, Mexico coined a
term, filibusteros (freebooters), for
foreigners who came to places like
Baja California with ill intentions.
Many an adventurer saw in Mexico
the possibility of earning great
wealth quickly, if not illegally. One
of the better known filibusteroswas
William Walker, who in 1853 sailed
into the southern Baja California
port of La Paz with an expedition
of 200 armed men and captured
the city. For a short time, Walker
lived out his fantasy: he declared
himself president of Lower California.
Today's filibusterosmay be the
North American investors and real
estate entrepreneurs who want to
convert Baja California's wilderness
into an international tourist mecca.
The costs of selling off the coastline to tourist developers are many,
not the least of which is the destruction of authentic local culture. For
example, Mexico's Pacific coast
town of Acapulco has long been
marketed as an exotic, palm treeladen paradise of fancy hotels, and
a slow-paced Latin escape from
high-pressure urban life. The real
Acapulco, however, is now an overdeveloped resort with enormous
social, environmental, and city
planning problems. It has been
called "seedy, polluted, overpopulated, homogenized, overbuilt, money-crazed, exhausted"
(Harper's,July 1989, p. 44).

From Acapulco to Baja
Is this what awaits Baja California?
While tourism development does
offer measurable short-term benefits, it can create serious long-term
problems. To begin with, tourism
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facilitators commonly hand over
ownership of local property to
foreign interests, as is occurring in
Baja California. Moreover, such
development can wreak havoc on
the natural environment, as is clear
in Acapulco and other large-scale
resorts. Finally, unbridled tourism
can fracture and destroy the built
environment and, most important
of all, the local cultures it expresses
and anchors. In the latter regard,
the tourism economy is giving
foreign capital, in concert with a
class of elite Mexican "facilitators"-lawyers, bankers, financial
consultants, engineers, architects,
and government officials who assist
in setting up investment projectsthe power to reconstruct places
such as Baja California in the
image of their choice.
Consequently, Baja California's
striking landscape of small farming
communities and fishing villages
against a backdrop of wide-open
spaces is being transformed into
"tourist architecture"-a series of
resort complexes and generic
theme parks. One of the first
things a visitor notices on arriving
at the new population centers of
this desert peninsula-San Felipe,
Loreto, and Cabo San Lucas-is
the highway signs in English that
announce the sale of land for
single-family housing, golf villas,
and condominium developments.
The rural towns, with their traditional central plazas, are being
brushed aside in favor of streets
lined with international boutiques
and high-rise hotels.
Tourism development in general has come to encourage the
homogenization of places so as to
produce predictable, marketable
travel packages. Illustrative of this
trend are the ubiquitous Club Med
developments scattered along
Mexico's coasts. Club Med creates
a "safe" exotic enclave. As a truly
"placeless" form of tourist marketing, it offers a self-contained package: tourists need not venture
beyond resort walls to rub shoulders with the local people and experience their ways of life.

The growth machine that drives
such tourism development aims to
create a consumable product; if the
surrounding culture and material
conditions interfere with the marketing of the product, then they
are simply to be removed. From
this standpoint, the tourist is to be
provided with an uninterrupted
feeling of comfort and escape, a
strategy much like that employed
by gambling casino developers in
Las Vegas and Reno. There the
absence of clocks and the constant,
seductive evening-like lighting of
the gambling parlors are ploys to
create a timeless setting in which
consumers can escape.., and
spend. In Mexico the strategy is
the same, the difference being
that palm trees and thatched
beach cabanas are the local
props.
A leading Mexican architect,
Ricardo Legorreta, has designed a
number of major resort hotels, including the lavish Mayan templelike Camino Real in Ixtapa.
Describing his relationship with
Ixtapa's developers, Legorreta lamented that they failed to grasp
the need to integrate the architectural design with the regional
context. He added that "the main
attraction of Mexico's Pacific coast
is that it has the best climate in the
world, but the builders wanted to
seal all windows and put air conditioners in all 450 rooms" (public
lecture, School of Architecture,
University of California at San
Diego, February 4, 1989).
Selective tourism development
may indeed be healthy for Mexico's economy if its by-productsfrom environmental to cultural
pollution-are controlled. The
essence of Mexican culture is embodied by its many varied regions
and their powerful identities. This
is true even of the northern border
regions, in spite of the tight interweaving of their economy and pattern of life with those of the US.
Any form of development, tourism
or otherwise, that endangers regional identity should be questioned. .

New Books on Latin America and the Caribbean
Nicaragua Divided
La Prensa and the Chamorro Legacy

PatriciaTaylor Edmisten
"Edmisten puts current Nicaraguan politics into perspective and gives the reader a sense of the complexities of
the present situation."
-- Charles Ameringer, Pennsylvania State University
UNIVERSITY OF WEST FLORIDA PRESS
March 0972-3 Cloth $19.95

Dictionary of Latin American
Racial and Ethnic Terminology
Thomas M. Stephens
"For the first time a comprehensive collection of racial,
ethnic, and regional designations has been brought
together in one place.... It should dispel myths about
the lack of overt and covert discrimination in Latin
American ... a valuable dialectological tool."
-John M. Lipski, University of Florida
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA PRESS
March 0965-0 Cloth $45.00

The Journal of Don Francisco
Saavedra de Sangronis, 1780-1783
ed. FranciscoMorales Padr6n
trans. Aileen Moore Topping
'The turbulent and immensely fascinating Spanish
colonial world of the Caribbean at the close of the
American Revolution is stunningly revealed in this
excellently translated journal."
-Robert V. Remini, University of Illinois at Chicago
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA PRESS
0877-8 Cloth $28.00

Jose Lezama Lima,
Poet of the Image
Emilio F. Bejel
"A stimulating and rigorous analysis of one of Spanish
America's most difficult and complex writers ... a
significant addition to Lezama studies."--Justo C. Ulloa,
Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA PRESS
April 0980-4 Cloth $19.95

Between God and the Party
Religion and Politics in Revolutionary Cuba

John M. Kirk
"A comprehensive and balanced survey of relations
between church and state in Castro's Cuba.... Kirk's
careful analysis of the role of religion in the processes of
social change in Latin America ... also illuminates an
aspect of the Cuban revolution often ignored."--Choice
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH FLORIDA PRESS
0909-X Paper $15.00

First Encounters
Zespedes in East Florida, 1784-1790
Helen Hornbeck Tanner
"A very successful case-study of the East Florida
governorship in the first six years of Spain's return to the
peninsular province."-Americas
UNIVERSITY OF NORTH FLORIDA PRESS
0958-8 Paper $14.95

Spanish Explorations in the Caribbean
and the United States, 1492-1570

ed. Jerald T. Milanich & Susan Milbrath
"An excellent paradigm of what historical archaeology
and history have to offer in illuminating our past."
-Bruce D. Smith, Smithsonian Institution
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA PRESS
0946-4 Cloth $44.95; 0947-2 Paper $16.95

University Presses of Florida
15 NW 15th Street, Gainesville, Florida 32611, 904-392-1351
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Features: Mexico

Up-scale Migrants
by Nora Leticia Bringas

P

oor Mexico! So far from

God, so close to the
United States!" This widely cited declaration cuts
right to the heart of the
history of US-Mexican relations. In response, the constitution adopted by Mexico's 1910
revolution embraces a pragmatic
brand of nationalism, seeking both
to regulate and attract foreign capital. The constitution vests ownership of Mexico's land and natural
resources in the nation, and prohibits foreign ownership of land
within 100 kilometers of the
country's borders and 50 kilometers of its coasts. Yet it also empowers the state to transmit title or
concessions to private domestic
and foreign interests in accordance
with the "public good."
A prime example of pragmatism
in action was the economic policy
of President Luis Echeverria (197076), who, despite his nationalist
programs and image, established
foreign investment in tourism as
the fulcrum of his regional development strategy. Echeverria's strategy
revolved around two controversial
initiatives. The first was the introduction offideicomisos (trusts) granting foreigners 30-year leases on
littoral property (which current
president Carlos Salinas de Gortari
has extended to 60 years). The
second was the expropriation of advantageously located coastal ejidos,
communal rural landholdings
created through the revolution, for
transformation into international
tourism complexes. Echeverria's

Nora Leticia Bringas is a specialist on
tourism and nationaldevelopment at
El Colegio de la FronteraNorte, in
Tijuana,Mexico.
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plan was to compensate the campesinos for their land and incorporate them into the labor force of
tourism-based "growth poles." His
initiatives laid the local foundations for the tourism boom in Baja
California, which fits hand-in-glove
with the Salinas administration's
broader campaign to attract
foreign investment.

Tijuana-Ensenada
Along with the emergence of Tijuana as Mexico's principal site of
export-assembly industry, tourism
development has been a leading
factor in the accelerated urbanization of Baja California's TijuanaEnsenada zone, which ranks
behind the hinterland of Guadalajara as Mexico's second largest
"US colony." A pressing challenge
to Mexico's urban and regional
planners is to assess the impact of
tourism development as part of the
far-reaching process of transformation.
It is unknown how much of
Tijuana-Ensenada's striking population growth of recent years is
linked to the expansion of tourism,
including the development of that

sector's labor force. It is known
that in 1985 42,500 foreigners-almost exclusively retirees-resided
in the state of Baja California,
primarily in the Tijuana-Ensenada
corridor. This group was composed
mainly of US citizens (and secondarily of Canadians), with 20%
living as renters and 80% as
homeowners through fideicomisos.
The 1990 cost of buying a residence in this market sector begins
at $125,000.
It seems the clearest winners so
far are real estate developers, the
construction industry, and related
businesses. Another echelon of
beneficiaries seems to be the
providers of up-scale services to
foreign residents, including medical services to retirees. Moreover,
not only do foreign "buyers" obtain
attractive coastal housing at prices
substantially less than those of similar housing in the US, but they also
stand to profit, especially in the
long run.
It is unclear, though, how much
of the tourism-related investments,
expenditures, and profits stay in
Tijuana-Ensenada and in Mexico at
large. Moreover, tourism development seems to adversely affect the
quality and cost of housing and
public services for Mexicans, and
to generate jobs that are typically
low wage and unstable. The prevalence of "private beach" signs attests to the growing exclusion of
Mexicans from an important public resource, and coastal pollution
is worsening.
In this setting, a basic question
is whether an alternative development policy would result in more
widespread and durable benefits
for Mexicans. A related question
concerns the long-term political
ramifications-including for

regional planning and growth
management-of an expanding
concentration of foreign residents
in a crucial area of the Mexico-US
border.

InSixty Years ...
If the proliferation of fideicomisos
continues, we can anticipate two
overlapping scenarios for the end
of the 60-year period. On the one
hand, the Mexican government
could repossess the developed
properties, compensate the foreign
investors for the original and appreciated value, and resell the properties to Mexicans or foreigners on
similar or new fideicomiso terms. On
the other hand, the government
could return the contracts to
Mexican financial institutions,
which themselves would resell the
properties to foreigners under similar terms. Either way, a new buyer
could conceivably be a member of
the original buyer's family or a prestanombre, the original buyer under
the guise of another name or entity.
Mexico cannot afford delay in
recognizing the magnitude of the
social, environmental, and economic costs inherent in large-scale
real estate speculation and massive
population growth along the coast
of Baja California. To minimize
such costs, the Tijuana-Ensenada
area urgently needs a coastal planning and management agency with
the authority and resources to address the following concerns:
* The provision of housing and
services for the rapidly growing
local population, including guaranteed access to beaches.
* The prevention, through infrastructural development and legal
action, of the discharge of toxic
waste and untreated sewage.
* The designation of ecological
reserves for the conservation of
the coastal habitat and its wildlife.
The time has come for creative,
broad-ranging measures. At stake is
nothing less than the ecological,
economic, and cultural preservation of one of Mexico's most vulnerable regions. a

TijuanaEnsenada (Photos by Roberto C6rdova Leyva/Studio C)
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Los Vecinos: Life on the US-Mexico Border
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Politicized Religion
by Edward L. Cleary

Is Latin America Turning
Protestant?
by David Stoll. University of California
Press, 1990. 424 pp. $25.00.

Protestantism is sweeping Latin America. Social scientists tend to
ignore this phenomenon because, according
to scholar David Martin, they assume that the evangelical movement is apolitical. David Stoll, an
anthropologist who has been researching Latin American Protestantism for some ten years, does
not share this view.
After publishing Fishers of Men
orFoundersofEmpire? (London: Zed
Press and Cambridge, Mass.: Cultural Survival, 1982), Stoll turned
to the political implications of evangelical religion for Latin Americans
and North Americans alike. The effort resulted in a long journey.
Is Latin America TurningProtestant?
is not a fully developed work of
social science, but rather an intriguing, baffling, and frustrating volume of investigative reporting.

Assigning Blame
The book's plan is orderly enough:
it describes what is taking place;
points out the systemic failure of
the Catholic Church and why
groups in the US have been supporting Protestant missions and aid
programs of a certain kind; and dis-

Edward L. Cleary, of the Order of
Preachers,is professorand directorof
HispanicStudies at PontificalCollege
Josephinum, in Columbus, Ohio. He is
editor of Born of the Poor (University
of Notre Dame Press, 1990).
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cusses the main US-Latin American
implications.
Yet Stoll begins, and continues
well into the volume, with a disconcerting focus: the analysis of Protestantism in Latin America from the
perspective of North America. I
would have expected the volume to
dig deeply into Latin American
soil, especially given that its author
is an anthropologist. Instead the
first half of the book is largely stuck
in the US or with persons like evangelist Luis Palau, who is portrayed

as "the Billy Graham of Latin
America" (p. 121). Even when the
book's plan calls for a shift to Latin
America, the framework of analysis
remains nearly the same. The
reader is repeatedly left to consider
North Americans and their organizations.
Organizations such as the Fuller
Theological Seminary and Church
Growth Institutes are well worth
learning about, but why not emphasize evangelical groups in Latin
America, some of which have been
successful for almost 100 years?
And why not emphasize the remarkable Latin American qualities of the
region's evangelical groups? A

more insightful approach could
have begun with, say, La Iglesia
Metodista Pentecostal,the largest
Protestant organization in Chile,
which was started by US Methodists
but which quickly broke off and expanded tremendously.
Stoll eschews such a choice because he is interested less in Latin
American Protestantism than in assigning blame to the US religious
right for all they have done to
Latin America: "That evangelism
is a spiritual con game ... is the
conspiracy explanation for evangelical growth in Latin America ... I
wanted to refute, not affirm. Yet
Oliver North and his evangelists
... have shown that it is true....
Evangelism continues to be used as
an instrument not just of US foreign policy but of covert and immoral 'dirty wars"' (p. 327).
Whatever limitations Stoll's intentions may impose, the book is
an important, if rough-cut, pioneer
study. He provides an investigative
journalistic survey, giving the
reader valuable knowledge of the
array of persons, movements, and
organizations involved. He shows
that evangelical religion is much
more substantial than we would discern from the descriptions of it as
ideological fluff. The reader closes
the book with a deepened understanding of the attraction, and at
times the beauty, of evangelical religion, especially among the poor.
In addition, Stoll presents some
stimulating arguments, even if he
leaves most of them unresolved.
The effort of tracking persons
and organizations, however, is immodestly done. In providing a bewildering display of people and
doctrines, Stoll tells us everything
he knows but much that the reader
may not care about or need to

M

know. Moreover, Stoll shows little
theological understanding. In the
case of liberation theology he gives
us little more than a cartoon depiction. Stoll reifies liberation theology, making it seem as if all
progressive Catholics and some
Protestants are motivated by a
single fully internalized vision. He
never defines liberation theology,
even though it appears in the book
as a central force in Latin American religion. From Stoll's description, it seems to be any religious
tendency for progressive change in
Latin American society.
Almost all of Stoll's mapping in
the US comprises the religious
scene in California. He imparts little sense of other religious movements in the US with special ties to
Latin America or to the mission
movement, like the Assemblies of
God (Springfield, Missouri; Anderson, Indiana; and Cleveland, Tennessee) and the national networks
of Pentecostal and charismatic
researchers. Even regarding California he would have enlightened
the readers much more by interviewing Pentecostal researchers,
such as Everett Wilson of Bethany
Bible College, than by interviewing
persons who are largely marginal
to Latin America.

AWider Lens
How accurate is the book in describing Latin America's religious
awakening? Stoll leads the reader
through many of the available statistics and carefully lays out their
often unrealistic assumptions. By
any of the measures he presents,
the phenomenon of evangelical
growth is impressive. On its own,
however, the analysis of evangelical
Protestantism fails to provide the

wide lens needed to view Latin
American religion in general.
For one thing, Catholicism, as
practiced by a significant minority,
has engendered a self-reliance that
allows for a greater national character of its churches. The statistics for
some aspects of Latin American
Catholicism are as impressive as
the growth charts for evangelical
Protestantism: the number of seminarians in most Latin American
countries jumped 300-700% in
1972-87; 120,000 nuns serve in
many innovative capacities; and millions of lay persons have assumed
responsibilities within the Church
in ways only dreamed of 20 years
ago. The religious commitment of
many of these lay Catholics rivals
that of evangelicals. Add to these
statistics anthropological reports of
the flourishing of syncretic religions, such as spiritism in Brazil,
and a more comprehensive viewpoint emerges for assessing the excited talk about evangelical growth.
Indeed, we know little about the extent that people switch back and
forth between Catholicism, evangelical Protestantism, and other
religions. Stoll, however, barely
scratches the surface of these
dimensions, except to say that the
desire for exorcism and similar
local responses have developed in
the face of modernizing impulses.
Research on Protestant expansion, as well as on shifts in the
Catholic Church and on syncretic
religions, needs to devote much
greater attention than does Stoll to
explaining the larger social forces
that underlie the religious awakening. Stoll tends to eschew a systemic approach in favor of what he
calls a "pot-shot" one. An example
of this inadequacy is the book's
treatment of the noted advocate of

Indian rights, Ecuador's bishop
Le6nidas Proano. Nowhere in
Ecuador have evangelicals gained
a greater foothold than in Proaiio's
Riobamba diocese, yet Stoll gives
insufficient attention to the social
forces that have facilitated their impressive gains in this zone.
Impoverishment and political
oppression, as emphasized by Stoll,
only partially explain Latin America's religious transformation. An
understanding of social forces has
led some Latin Americanists concerned with religion, such as
Daniel Levine and Scott Mainwaring, to point to several trends:
concentrated agrarian landownership, large-scale migration,
improved transport, expanded
literacy, and access to media. A
consequence of these trends is the
undermining of traditional ties between elites and the masses, which
leaves the popular sectors open to
alternative ideas and forms of organizations. In this respect, Stoll's
work is unrefined; it needs more
than scattered statements about
transactions in villages or unwarranted generalizations about
revitalization movements.
Regarding Stoll's political
agenda, the evidence he presents
about the role of the religious right
among evangelicals is indeed frightening. In this respect, US politics
has corrupted Latin American
religion. On the other hand, Stoll's
characterization of liberation theology is unfortunate and dangerous.
Among his statements are these:
"The kinds of defiance liberation
theology tends to encourage ...
have been suicidal in many times
and places," and its "frequent assumption of the need for revolutionary upheaval indicates that
more or less safely situated intellec-
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tuals have had an outsize role in its
production" (p. 313).
Since I have heard accusations
similar to Stoll's, I defer to Arthur
F. McGovern's Liberation Theology
and Its Critics:An Assessment (Orbis
Books, 1989, p. 269): "I have yet to
find any statement by a liberation
theologian calling for violent
revolution or declaring it necessary
...in Latin America." Accusations
like Stoll's not only are unfounded
but do great harm. As Charles L.
Moutenot, aJesuit priest, writes:
"This language is terribly misleading. It feeds into the persistent and
false characterization of liberation
theology as theological justification
for violence and its proponents as
advocates of violent revolution"
(New York Times Book Review, May
22, 1990, p. 4).
The false portrayal of liberation
theology has contributed to many
deaths in Latin America. Such
stereotyping has no place in a book
whose publication will provoke expanded interest in Latin America's
religious awakening.

Raising Bolivia
Economic Change and Rural
Resistance in Southern Bolivia
1880-1930
by Erick Langer. Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 1989. 269 pp. Cloth.
$42.00.
In the 20th century the elite in
several Latin American countries
initiated agrarian reform measures
designed to radically alter the structure of the rural economy and to
redistribute land. Most such
reforms came in response to perceived problems in the countryside, but generally they were
imposed from the top down. One
notable exception was the 1952
Bolivian agrarian reform, which
had its origins in the politics of the
Movimiento NacionalistaRevolucionario and in the agitation of the
autonomous peasant leagues.
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Numerous social scientists have
studied the consequences of the implementation of that reform, yet
few have examined the pre-reform
agrarian structure and the social
forces that led to the formation in
the 1930s and 1940s of the dynamic peasant-league movement.
Erick Langer's book is one of the
first monographic studies of Bolivia's pre-reform agrarian structure.
Langer describes the process of
agrarian change and the transformation of rural social relations in
Chuquisaca Department as a consequence of a profound crisis in
southern Bolivian silver mining in
the 1880s. According to the author,
the Sucre elite reacted to the downturn in silver mining by investing
in land, which was more secure but
less profitable. Moreover in some
instances they attempted to modernize labor relations on their
haciendas. Investments in land entailed the purchase of existing
haciendas or of lands from the corporate Indian communities abolished by legislation enacted in
1874. Economic stagnation in
southern Bolivia affected agriculture in Chuquisaca Department,
but attempts to modify labor relations on haciendas generated
several types of resistance, including labor strikes. The growing level
of rural violence culminated in
a massive rural revolt in 1927,
which attempted to restore pre1860 land tenure patterns and
social relations.
Langer supports his arguments
with an impressive amount of data
abstracted from cadastral surveys,
inventories and wills, trial records,
and land sale contracts taken from
local and regional archives. In addition he makes use of a number of
private hacienda account books, an
invaluable source of information
generally not available to historians
of rural history. Nonetheless, there
are many flaws in Langer's model,
as well as major assumptions without empirical substantiation.
For instance, Langer provides
only a handful of examples to verify his hypothesis that members of

the Sucre elite responded to the
mining crisis by diversifying their
investments through purchases of
land (chapter 3). Furthermore he
does not provide evidence that mining investors became the dominant
landowning group in Chuquisaca
Department. A comparison of
cadastral surveys prepared after
1880 with published lists of the
stock owners in the large silver mining companies-a relatively simple
exercise-could have documented
quantitatively changing patterns of
hacienda ownership and whether
there was an infusion of silver
money into Chuquisaca land.
While Langer regards land
ownership as a relatively safe investment with a modest return, he
does not fully employ the rich
source of the account books to outline the workings of the internal
economy of the hacienda. Moreover the relative profitability of
land was linked to the diversity of
investments by the elite, other
sources of income from government and employment, and revenue generated from agriculture to
support a certain lifestyle. Langer
offers several examples of the investment portfolio of members of
the Sucre elite (chapter 3, especially p. 41), but needs a more
comprehensive view of the Chuquisaca elite to prove this important point.
The author presents a convincing, well-documented, and detailed
discussion of regional variations in
the process of agrarian transition
in Chuquisaca, but does so within
the awkward conceptual framework
of the administrative jurisdiction of
the province. Bolivia is dominated
by a wide variety of ecological
zones that are distinct in their historical development, and the provinces Langer studies in Chuquisaca
each contain two or more such
zones. While Langer outlines the
rural history of the dominant
ecological zone in each province,
he is forced to make exceptions for
developments in the other ecological zones, detracting from the
strength of his analysis.

Still, Langer's book has much to
recommend it. It is an important
contribution to the historical literature on 19th-century Latin American rural history, and the best
documented and argued regional
study of pre-reform Bolivian agrarian structure. Langer's understanding of rural social relations
and the causes of different forms
of rural resistance is innovative. His
conceptualization of the importance of reciprocity in social relations on haciendas (pp. 5-7), when
coupled with John Tutino's notion
of subsistence security and insecurity as elaborated in a recent study,
provides a powerful way of explaining Latin American peasant reactions to change in their world. The
discussion of the erosion of the
land base of the corporate Indian
community following the passage
of liberal legislation in the 1870s is
sound. Finally, Langer provides a
strong conceptual framework in
relating rural change in Chuquisaca Department to larger
developments in the interregional
economy in the late 19th century.
RobertJackson
University of Miami

State of the Art
The Film Industry in Brazil:
Culture and the State
by RandalJohnson.Pittsburgh: University ofPittsburghPress, 1987. 288 pp.
Cloth. $28.95.
As a commercial art form, film production straddles the boundaries
between industry and culture. In
the US it is a well-established, multibillion-dollar industry controlled
by Hollywood studios that function
as independent, private enterprises. In much of the rest of the
world, however, the film industry is
substantially supported and heavily
regulated by the state through film
boards and agencies. State protection, regulation, and support stem

from the delicate and difficult nature of the film business, as well as
from its power as a cultural medium of mass communication.
RandalJohnson's TheFilm
Industry in Brazil: Cultureand the
State is meticulously researched
and provides not only a thorough
discussion of the development of
the Brazilian film industry, but also
valuable insights on the relationships between film, culture, and
government. The book focuses on
the legislative, regulatory, and administrative programs implemented to promote and protect
the Brazilian film industry since its
inception in the early 1900s.Johnson analyzes these policies within
the framework of Brazilian political, economic, and cultural
dynamics.
Johnson warns against defining
the relationship between Brazilian
cinema and the state as based solely on a national industry's need for
protection. Still, the dominating
role of foreign-especially USfilm in the Brazilian market demonstrates a historical and consistently
formidable competition for the national cinema and its audiences.
Like Coca-Cola, hamburgers, and
rock-and-roll, US films are an omnipresent cultural force that create
an audience appetite for the style
and technology that mark its
productions. As early as the 1920s
US films comprised more than
80% of the Brazilian market, and
by 1929 Brazil had become the US
industry's fourth largest market.
The US continues to control almost 70% of Brazilian screen time.
In order to nurture the development of Brazilian film and to create opportunities for its exhibition,
Brazilian filmmakers have looked
to their state for assistance.
Much of the relationship between the Brazilian film industry
and the state has focused on protectionist policies.Johnson addresses
the complexity of these policies in
part by identifying the segments of
the Brazilian film industry that
benefit from cooperation with foreign distributors and producers.

The tension between, on the one
hand, Brazilian distributors and exhibitors (or theater owners), and
on the other hand Brazilian producers, dates to the early days of
the industry. Initially the industry
was vertically integrated, with individuals or small companies producing and exhibiting films. By
1912 the business of film rentals
increased in step with the US film
industry's development on an international scale. The call for state
support and protection was heard
in Brazil as early as 1920. The quest
for the most effective means for
protecting and promoting the
Brazilian film industry has characterized the relation of Brazilian
filmmakers, distributors, and exhibitors with the state for some 70
years.
The Film Industry in Brazil chronologically traces the evolution of
the state's film-related policies, programs, and agencies, as well as the
initiatives of the film community itself. Central to this interplay have
been screen quotas for Brazilian
films, import restrictions and tariffs
on foreign films, state subsidies
and financing, exemptions from
custom duties and import tariffs on
film equipment and raw stock, and,
not the least, censorship. Among
other things, Johnson presents a
balanced mix of factual detail and
analysis regarding the early formation of Brazilian film studios, such
as Santa Cruz and Atlantida, the
development of the Cinema Novo
group of filmmakers and the vision
they represented, and the proliferation of the film commissions and
agencies that were the antecedents
of Embrafilme and ConselhoNacional
do Cinema.
The Film Industry in Brazil opens
an important door in analyzing the
interplay of filmmakers, distributors, exhibitors, and the state in
the development of the cinema as
both an industry and an expression
of national culture.

Polita Gordon
Miami, Florida
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Stating Goals
The Caribbean in World
Affairs: The Foreign Policies
of the English-speaking States
by JacquelineA. Braveboy-Wagner.
Boulder: Westview Press, 1989.
244 pp. $25.95.
Scholars and politicians in the
Caribbean anticipate having to
deal with significant challenges
and changes in the 1990s, not only
at the domestic level but at the regional, hemispheric, and global
levels as well.
The Caribbeanin World Affairs
is a first in its field, filling a long
existing void in the study of Caribbean foreign policy. AuthorJacqueline A. Braveboy-Wagner provides a
comprehensive analysis of the
Caribbean's foreign policy pursuits
and problems, stressing that the
goals of Caribbean foreign policy-security, economic development,
and prestige-are neither static
nor considered equal priorities by
the region's 12 states. She observes
that, depending upon domestic
and foreign circumstances, the
hierarchy of goals and the selection of strategies has varied over
time and among states. In examining the issues of Caribbean foreign
policy, the author looks at patterns
of interaction at the regional, hemispheric, and international levels.
She takes the position that the
region's foreign policy pursuits
have been characterized not only
by cooperation at those levels, but
by conflicting relations with state
and nonstate actors at each level.
What stands out in the study is
the multidimensional nature of
Caribbean foreign policy. While
Braveboy-Wagner is careful to show
wide regional variations, she points
out that in setting goals and implementing policy there is sometimes more commonality in the
Eastern Caribbean than in the
region as a whole. To illustrate
peculiarities and generalities she
uses case studies of Grenada and
St. Lucia.
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The author uses some generally
accepted propositions about decisionmaking under crisis in her
cogent analysis of the 1983 Grenada affair. Nevertheless, she transplants propositions applicable to
intrastate crisis to the interstate
context, thereby obscuring the
dynamics of such decisionmaking
at the domestic level. One can
indeed look at variables such as
the decision unit, information
and information flows, and operational environment in assessing
both domestic and international
crisis decisionmaking. The nature
and dynamics of those variables,
however, differ from level to
level.
One could argue that the Grenada affair was the only recent
situation in the Caribbean that
qualifies as a significant domestic
crisis caused by foreign policy, and
hence was the only candidate for
discussion. There were, however,
earlier crises in the Caribbean that
might have provided scope for an
analysis of domestic decisionmaking. One was the 1976 Cubana Air
disaster, which presented a foreign
policy crisis to Barbados, among
other countries. Another was the
1981 security threat to Belize,
which necessitated crisis decisionmaking in that country.
In looking at diplomacy in the
Caribbean, Braveboy-Wagner suggests that the patterns and number
of official visits are indexes of diplomatic linkage and country importance. I agree with this view, but it
is important to differentiate among
the visits, even "high-level" ones,
assessing not only their objectives
but also their results, including the
correlation of results and objectives.
The observation that Trinidad
and Tobago was the only country
to appoint foreign ministers, rather
than select them from among the
elected leadership, ignores parallels elsewhere. In Guyana, for example, attorney Fred Wills was
appointed foreign minister in 1975
following the departure of Shridat
Ramphal to become common-

wealth secretary general. And in
1978 Rashleigh Jackson, the present foreign minister, was elevated
from the position of permanent
representative to the UN to become Wills's successor.
Braveboy-Wagner notes what
many observers of Caribbean
foreign policy would know: much
of the region's foreign policy is
devoid of systematic formulation
and execution. There is considerable "muddling through." Her call
for Caribbean states to rationalize
their foreign policy bureaucracies
so as to maximize efficiency deserves support and emphasis.
The study concludes that the
foreign policy goals of Caribbean
states have been realistic. Security
goals have revolved around preserving territorial and political sovereignty. Economic development has
been defined in "gradualist and survivalist terms." Prestige has generally meant participation in world
affairs. The strategies of Caribbean
foreign policy in pursuing these
goals, moreover, have been largely
successful.
Of course there have been exceptions. For example, Guyana and
Jamaica once adopted bold and
somewhat unrealistic economic
development goals. Both countries
have also aimed at leadership in
sectors of the international community, particularly the Nonaligned Movement. Along the same
lines, the 1983 Grenada debacle
suggests that the New Jewel Movement strategy miscarried.
The Caribbeanin World Affairs
is well organized, simple to read,
and up to date. It is essential reading for scholars and practitioners
of Caribbean foreign policy. The
book makes admirable use of the
normative and empirical approaches to international politics,
making it valued reading for people interested in comparative foreign policy in general and the
foreign policy of small states in
particular.
Ivelaw L. Griffith
Hunter College

A Sordid History
Neighbors in Turmoil:
Latin America
by James D. Cockcroft. New York:
Harperand Row, 1989. 649 pp. Cloth.

$27.95.
The Reagan administration's goit-alone policy toward Latin America spawned a number of books
designed to help Americans better
understand our neighbors to the
south. In Neighbors in Turmoil,
James D. Cockcroft takes on the
huge task of explaining the internal and external factors important
to understanding the changing
political realities in the region. Instead of covering only the Central
American and Caribbean "hot
spots," his book deals with all of
Latin America (including a rare
chapter on Puerto Rico), focusing
on much of the sordid history of
US-Latin American relations.
Neighbors in Turmoil is basically
an anti-interventionist critique of
US relations with Latin America.
Meant to be used as a textbook to
understand modern Latin American history and politics, it attempts
to construct a more enlightened
policy toward the hemisphere. In
this respect, a useful feature is a
"Documents" section consisting of
Reagan-era items such as the Kissinger Commission Report and
various Central American peace
initiatives.
The controversial aspects of
Latin American politics and US
policy toward the region are incorporated in such a way as to encourage (some would say provoke)
classroom debate or group research projects. Although Cockcroft provides opposing viewpoints
in hopes of stimulating critical
thinking by students on contemporary issues, he places a great deal
of blame for the turmoil afflicting
the hemisphere squarely on flawed
US policy and the historical power
of military and civilian oligarchs
opposed to meaningful reform.
This emphasis stems in part from

Cockcroft's previous work in the
areas of "dependency" analysis and
"cooptation/control" politics.
Economic explanations of the
US role in Latin America and the
nature of domestic turmoil receive
the most credence as each country
is examined. The connection between economic history and political turmoil is the major thread that
ties together the fate of the Latin
American countries and their relationship with the US. Cockcroft
thus uses much of the current economic problems confronting Latin
America-drugs, debt burdens, economic enclaves, unemployment,
trade imbalances-to provide the
backdrop to the ideological, labor,
peasant, religious, and civil-military
conflict so prevalent in the region.
While all of these factors are important and need closer examination
for understanding the complexities
of Latin American turmoil, one
gets the feeling that there are more
economic and political successes in
modern Latin America than are included in this analysis.
In Mexico, for example, the
road to crisis is blamed on foreign
intervention and competition
among elites for control over a
hard-working but rebellious labor
force. Honduras is a nation that is
dying from US influence. Puerto
Rico would be a thriving independent island in the Caribbean if the
US did not have such a firm grip
on economic and political activities. Cockcroft states, for example,
that "during the Watergate scandal
of the Nixon presidency in the
early 1970s, it was discovered that
the FBI had a long history of interfering in Puerto Rico's elections
and harassing advocates of Puerto
Rican independence" (p. 276).
The flaws in Nicaragua's and
Cuba's efforts to solve the problems of development are tied closely with past and present US policy.
While the US is not blameless in
these two cases, little is said about
the economic or military influence
of the USSR or the flawed policies
of their revolutionary elites.
Further frustration stems from

the frequent quotes, without footnote references with which to track
down sources and context, that
Cockcroft uses to support his antiinterventionist thesis. Some of the
most troublesome are found in the
treatment of El Salvador and Guatemala. For example, "'The10,000
peasants residing on the slopes of
the Guazapa volcano outside San
Salvador suffered more tonnage of
nonatomic bombs per square inch
of territory than any other people
in history" (p. 142). For Guatemala, Cockcroft writes "By 1977 the
number of disappeared from all
walks of life, including children,
approximated 40,000, the highest
figure in the world" (p. 112). To
bolster his economic explanation
of the turmoil in Puerto Rico, he
states "In the mid-1970s it [Puerto
Rico] was generating one quarter
or more of US corporation's profits
in all of Latin America" (p. 277).
Much of the descriptive material
dealing with turmoil and US policy
will disturb those of the "national
security" school of US-Latin American relations. Cockcroft concludes,
however, with nine thoughtful
recommendations to create a more
enlightened policy toward Latin
America, which revolve around
demilitarization, democratization,
debt forgiveness, and grassroots
development.
If the US is at some sort of
policy nadir in dealing with Latin
America, perhaps books such as
Neighbors in Turmoil can begin to
turn the tide in a more optimistic
and healthy direction. Cockcroft's
survey of contemporary and historical developments in Latin America
may provide the necessary information with which to learn from the
past and to challenge US policymakers into thinking of the hemisphere as being intrinsically
important. Until this kind of revolutionary thinking about Latin
America takes hold, neither "benign neglect" nor "gunboat diplomacy" will lead the hemisphere in
the proper policy direction.
David W. Dent
Towson State University
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Sport in Latin America and the Caribbean
by Marian Goslinga

standard reference tool for research on Latin American sports. The quarterly PhysicalEducationIndex--which
includes sports-is a basic subject index to domestic and foreign periodicals published in English. It complements Arbena's bibliography but is limited by its lack of indexing by country.
Listed below are some recent publications attesting to the local interest in different aspects of sports. Baseball predominates in Central America and the Caribbean, soccer in South America, and mountaineering in
the Andean countries. Other entries deal with the growing field of sport and social analysis.

Serials

Books and Periodicals

Anuario de montaiia. Santiago:
Federaci6n de Andinismo y Excursionismo de Chile. [About mountaineering in the Andes.]

Actividades masivas gimnasticas
deportivas en Cuba. La Habana:
Editorial Cientifico-T&cnica, 1988.
154 p.

Anuario del futbol uruguayo.
Montevideo: Codevila.

Album fotogrifico del futbol paraguayo, 1901-1950. Asunci6n: Editorial Hist6rica, 1986. 142 p. $35.00.

Anuario deportivo Saprissa. San
Jose: Publisa. [About sports in
Costa Rica.]

An Annotated Bibliography of
Latin American Sport: Pre-Conquest to the Present. Joseph L. Arbena, ed. New York: Greenwood

Beisbol: guia oficial cubana. La
Habana: Instituto Cubano del
Libro. [Periodical of irregular
frequency.]

Press, 1989. 324 p.

Chile Ski. Asociaci6n de Centro de
Ski de Chile, ed. Santiago: Zig-Zag.
[Published annually.]
Revista brasileira de educapio
fisica e deportiva. Rio deJaneiro:
Ministbrio da Educaiao e Cultura,
Divisao de Educacao Fisica, Fundaao Nacional de Material Escolar. [Periodical of irregular
frequency.]

MarianGoslinga is the Latin
American and Caribbeanlibrarianat
FloridaInternationalUniversity.
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Antonio Alzamendi, el mejor
jugador de America (1986-1987):
un duraznense triunfal y ecos de su
vida deportiva. ManuelDemetrio
Souza. Durazno, Uruguay: ImprentaABC, 1988. 96 p. $14.00. [Biography of the Uruguayan soccer
player.]

IArriba Alianza!: testimonios personales. Augusto Alvarez Rodrich,
et al. Debate,v. 9, no. 48 (December
1987), p. 28-37. [About the Peruvian soccer team.]
Ballparks of North America: A
Comprehensive Historical Reference to Baseball Grounds, Yards,
and Stadiums, 1845 to Present.
Michael Benson.Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland, 1989. 475 p. $35.00. [Includes Central America and the
Caribbean.]

Black Martial Arts of the Caribbean. Robert Farris Thompson.
Review, no. 37 (January-June 1987),
p. 44-47.
Costa Rica's Golden Girl Makes a
Splash. Matt Kenny. Americas, v. 40,
no. 4 (July-August 1988), p. 53-54.
Crisis, pues, y un poco de deporte.
Abelardo Sinchez-Le6n. Debate,
v. 10, no. 49 (March-April 1988),
p. 67-68. [About sports in Peru.]
Cuba's Open Secret: Fidel-ity in
Sports. Ross Atkin. ChristianScience
Monitor, v. 79 (August 7, 1987), p. 1.
Decimocuartos (XIV) juegos deportivos centroamericanos y del
Caribe. La Habana: Editorial
Cientifico-Tecnica, 1987. 504 p.
$7.90.
El deporte indigena de America.
Hugo AngelJaramillo.2nd ed.
Pereira, Colombia: Corporaci6n
Biblioteca Pfiblica, 1988. 185 p.

$5.00.
Deporte y delito. AntonioJose
Cancino, ed. Bogota: Universidad
Externado de Colombia, 1989.
[About social aspects of sports in
Colombia.]
Detras del tinel: 50 anios en el
fitbol. JorgeElmer Banki. Buenos
Aires: Fraterna, 1988. 285 p.

0

Dominicanos en grandes ligas:
hechos y hazaias, 1956-1986.
HeribertoMorrison. Santo Domingo:
Taller, 1987. 119 p. $7.95.

Horns, Capes, and Courage.
Linda Cahill. Americas, v. 40, no. 6
(November-December 1988), p. 3841. [About bull fights.]

Posibilidades y practica de la
cetreria en Colombia. Alvaro
Torres Barreto. Correo de Los Andes,
no. 45 (June-July 1987), p. 33-50.

Epoca de oro del futbol en Costa
Rica. FernandoNaranjoMadrigal.
San Jose: Editorial Costa Rica,
1988. 416 p.

Italia '90 a la vista. Abelardo
Sinchez-Le6n. Debate,v. 10, no. 50
(May-June 1988), p. 63-64. [About
soccer in Peru.]

Rio's Carnival of Cars. Mair Pena
Neto. Americas, v. 40, no. 6 (November-December 1988), p. 20-25.

Los que entraron en la historia del
deporte. Pablo A. Ramirez. Todo Es
Historia,v. 22, no. 254 (August
1988), p. 38-59. [About athletes in

Sport and Society in Latin America:
Diffusion, Dependency, and the
Rise of Mass Culture. Joseph L.
Arbena, ed. New York: Greenwood

Eternos rivales 1908-1988: CaracasMagallanes, Pastora-Gavilanes.
Caracas: Distribuidora Inca, 1988.
309 p. $10.00
El futbol y su injerencia en el habla
de los uruguayos. Hector Balsas.
Foro Literario,v. 10, no. 17 (JanuaryJune 1987), p. 57-62.
Ganaderia, pesca y caza en el delta
bonaerense. Ana Maria Rosato.
DesarrolloEconomico, v. 27, no. 108
(January-March 1988), p. 607-26.
[About hunting in Argentina.]
Geometry of Death. Alberto
Sarmiento. Americas, v. 40, no. 6
(November-December 1988), p. 4243. [About bull fights.]
Guia nacional de los deportes.
Comite Olimpico Uruguayo, Confederacion Uruguaya de Deportes.Montevideo: Distribuidora COOPRENI,
1988. 333 p. $21.00.
Hanging Around over Rio. Carl
Purcell. Americas, v. 39, no. 5 (September-October 1987), p. 46-49.
[About hang-gliding in Brazil.]

Argentina.]
El Orinoco medio: su importancia
para explicar la relaci6n entre el
juego de pelota de los otomaco de
las Antillas y de Mesoambrica.
Alberta Zucchi. Boletin de la Academia Nacionalde la Historia (Venezuela), v. 71, no. 282 (April-June
1988), p. 443-77.
Otra vez el v61ley. Gianfranco Castagnola. Debate,v. 9, no. 48 (December 1987), p. 4 6 -4 7 . [About Peru.]
Pasajes y personajes del hipismo
caraquefio. Gustavo Noguera.
Caracas: Distribuidora Inca, 1987.
90 p. $8.95.
Physical Education and Sport in
Brazil.J. C.J. Piccoli. PhysicalEducation Review (Manchester, England),
v. 11, no. 2 (Autumn 1988), p. 14146.
Politica y fitbol. Pablo A. Ramirez.
TodoEs Historia,v. 21, no. 248
(February 1988), p. 34-43. [About

Argentina.]
Hoofbeats from the Pampas.
Gustavo Levene. Americas, v. 40,
no. 6 (November-December 1988),
p. 26-31. [About horseback riding
in Argentina.]

La politique culturelle sportive et
patrimoniale en Guadeloupe.
Basse-Terre: Conseil G6neral de la
Guadeloupe, 1987. 104 p.

Press, 1988. 162 p.
Sport and Sport Themes in Latin
American Literature: A Sampler.
Joseph L. Arbena. Arete: The Journal
of Sport Literature (San Diego,
California), v. 5, no. 1 (Fall 1987),
p. 143-59.
Standing Tall at Short: Dominican
Republic Is Leading Exporter of
Shortstops. Steve Wulf. Sports Illustrated,v. 66 (February 9, 1987),

p. 132.
Tacking Antigua's Swells. Gary M.
Goodlander. Americas, v. 40, no. 6
(November-December 1988), p. 3237.
Traditionele Sport en Spelvormen
in Zuid-Amerika (Traditional
Sports and Games in South America). V. Van Mele. Hermes, v. 20,
no. 4 (1989), p. 465-74. [Periodical
published in Leuven, Belgium, by
the Instituut voor Lichamelijke Opleiding (Institute for Physical Education). Article has summaries in
English and French.]
Travel '88: Destination Sports.

Americas, v. 40, no. 6 (NovemberDecember 1988), p. 18-19.
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New and Recent Books on Latin America
THE GRAND STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES IN LATIN AMERICA
Tom J. Farer
In this collection of essays, Tom Farer examines critically the stand taken by U.S. foreign policy makers on
such issues as right- and left-wing dictatorships, revolution, human rights and national autonomy. In this
fascinating manner, fusing sharp observations at times with polemical intent, Farer scrutinizes the key
assumptions, including the "Soviet or revolutionary threat," which have guided American foreign policy for Latin
America since the end of World War II. Farer describes the grand strategy of the United States in Latin America
(he sees very much the same strategic assumptions guiding U.S. policy throughout the Third World) as
unrealistic and misguided in terms both of U.S. interests and ideals. His essays combine a sophisticated
analysis of Latin American society with assessment of U.S. policy from legal, moral and strategic perspectives.
ISBN: 0-88738-155-3 (cloth)
448 pp.
$39.95

THREE LATIN AMERICAN SOCIOLOGISTS
GINO GERMANI, PABLO GONZALES CASANOVA, FERNANDO HENRIQUE CARDOSO
Joseph A. Kahl, new Introduction by Peter B. Evans
This is the long overdue second edition of Joseph A. Kahl's masterful Modernization, Exploitation, and
Dependency in Latin America. In the book, Kahl describes, examines and introduces the life and work of three
of the most important figures in the development of comparative politics and political sociology: Gino Germani
(Argentina), Pablo Gonzales Casanova (Mexico) and Fernando Henrique Cardoso (Brazil). As Peter B. Evans
points out in his splendid Introduction, the book has not lost its importance and attractiveness in the years that
have passed. Rather, the subsequent developments in comparative scholarship, as exemplified in the fate of
modernization and dependency theory, have only highlighted the influence of the three Latin Americans.
ISBN: 0-88738-169-3 (cloth)
$24.95
ISBN: 0-88738-700-4 (paper)
240pp.
$14.95

POLITICS AND PETROLEUM IN ECUADOR
John D. Martz
In this book, John D. Martz probes the differences and similarities between military authoritarianism and
democratic pluralism through an analysis of the politics of petroleum in Ecuador. Martz uses a textured and
detailed analysis of global oil companies and nationalist politics to trace the growth and evolution of Ecuador's
petroleum industry. Against this interplay of politics and the nationalistic struggle against multinational
pressures, he compares policymaking under military and civilian government.
ISBN: 0-88738-132-4 (cloth)
432 pp.
$34.95

REVOLUTION AND REACTION: BOLIVIA 1964-1985
James M. Malloy and Eduardo Gamarra
This volume focuses on two decades of political life in Bolivia, from the overthrow of civilian president Victor
Paz Estenssoro in November, 1964 until his return to office in August, 1985. The body of the book provides an
account of the main contours of political economy in Bolivia from 1964 until 1985. The authors also present an
interpretative analysis of the problem of regime formation in Bolivia by focusing on the alternations among
various authoritarian and democratic modes of govemance. In a concluding chapter the authors provide an
analytical framework tying Bolivia into more regional trends concerning the questions of regime formation and
transition. Bolivia is seen as an extreme case of a common set of problems that have pervaded the region
during this period.
ISBN: 0-88738-159-6 (cloth)
256 pp.
$29.95
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